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Introduction
During the interwar period the terms "Melayu Raya" and "Indonesia Raya" 
(Greater Malaysia and Greater Indonesia) came to be used to signify an enlarged 
nation incorporating the Malay Peninsula, Java, Sumatra, and the other Indone­
sian islands. * 1 Some sort of political association between Malaya and Indonesia was 
advocated in the 1920s by a group of Malay and Indonesian students at Al-Azhar 
University in Cairo. But they had not "worked [it] out in any detail," nor pro­
ceeded beyond "sentiment and exhortation."2 During these years, the nostalgic 
concept of an ethnic Malay unity or cultural continuity, based on a common histor­
ical past, a common race, and a common religion, was a recurring theme in the
*This article, the first draft of which was written in 1977, deals mainly with 
Ibrahim Yaacob's prewar and wartime activities for which is he is best remembered 
in West Malaysia. I am indebted to many people for their valuable assistance dur­
ing my research in connection with Ibrahim’s activities. In particular I would like 
to thank the following: Ishak Haji Muhammad, Ahmad Boestamam, A. Samad Ismail, 
Datuk (D r.) Awang Hassan (Malaysian High Commissioner to Australia), Professor 
Yoichi Itagaki, Professor Shinichi Nagai, and General Fujiwara for granting me 
interviews; Akira Oki for translating the Japanese sources used in the text;
Robert Reece for letting me use notes from his interview with Ibrahim Yaacob in 
Jakarta; and Anthony Reid and David Marr for their comments on earlier drafts 
of this paper. Responsibility for it as it now stands and for all translations from 
Malay including the Jawi text is, however, entirely mine. I wish also to acknowl­
edge with thanks the permission granted me by the Department of History, Uni- 
versiti Kebangsaan Malaysia to use the two papers prepared by Ibrahim Yaacob 
which were to have been presented to the department in August 1973 in a series 
of seminars on leadership in Malaysia, but which were not delivered, as the Malay­
sian Government refused him permission to speak. Note: In the footnotes the 
abbreviations CO and WO refer respectively to the British Colonial Office and 
War Office files in the Public Record Office, London.
1. "Melayu Raya" was the term more commonly used by Malays, and "Indonesia 
Raya" by Indonesians. One does, however, come across Indonesian-influenced 
Malays such as Ibrahim Yaacob who preferred the term "Indonesia Raya" or used 
both terms interchangeably. See Iskander Kamel Agastya (the adopted Indonesian 
name of Ibrahim Yaacob), Sedjarah dan Perdjuangan di Malaya [History and Strug­
gle in Malaya] (Yogyakarta: Nusantara, 1951), p. 53, where he states, " . . .  
'Indonesia Raya' itulah tudjuan 'Melayu Raya.'"
2. See W. R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (Kuala Lumpur: University 
of Malaya Press, 1967), p. 89; see also W. R. Roff, "Indonesian and Malay Stu­
dents in Cairo in the 1920's," Indonesia, 9 (April 1970), pp. 73-88.
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columns of such newspapers from Cairo as Seruan Azhar, and of Saudara, the 
mouthpiece of the pan-Islamic modernist Kaum Muda (Young Group) in Penang, led 
by Shaykh Mohd. Tahir Jallaluddin. The greater numbers of newspapers and 
periodicals which came in from Sumatra and Java (such as Persatuan Indonesia, 
Perwarta Deli, Pertja Selatan, Bintang Hindia, Bintang Timur, Pedoman Masjara- 
kat and Fikiran Rakjat3 4) exposed Malay students to nationalist thinking in the 
Indonesian archipelago.
Shaykh Tahir and other Kaum Muda activists from Sumatra attempted to spread 
their teachings to the Malay States, but their activities were checked by both the 
traditional religious authorities and the Malay aristocracy, with administrative 
backing, whenever required, from the British. Consequently, these reformists 
found sanctuary only in the Straits Settlements, particularly in Penang, where 
direct British rule permitted the Muslim Advisory Board less authority than it en­
joyed in the Malay States which were under the sultans. ** Because the impact of 
the Kaum Muda movement in Malaya was mainly intellectual, it failed to develop a 
political nationalism capable of attracting mass support, and secular mass politics 
from Java exerted a greater pull on most young Malay students. In the wake of 
the 1926-27 uprisings in Indonesia they were first attracted towards communism,5 
but after Sukarno established the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) many were won 
over by the charismatic personality of the Indonesian leader.
During the 1930s, support for the idea of a political union between the two 
countries came from a few intellectuals in Malaya and Indonesia, but there is little 
evidence that the advocates had thought out what form such an association should 
take, or how the union of two territories under different colonial regimes was to 
be achieved.6 Despite their close commercial and cultural ties, British Malaya and
3. Agastya, Sedjarah, p. 63.
4. Roff, Malay Nationalism, pp. 81-82. The Kaum Muda leaders whom Ibrahim 
remembered as being outstanding in Malaya at that time were Shaykh Tahir and 
Kiyai Mohd. Fadhilillah Suhaemi. Agastya, Sedjarah, p. 58.
5. Ibrahim claims that political awareness was aroused in him and his fellow stu­
dents by the 1926-27 communist uprisings in West Java and West Sumatra. He 
said news of the uprisings was well received by the peninsular Malays. Many of 
the communists, including Djamaluddin Tamin, Tan Malaka, Budiman, Sutan Dje- 
nain, and Alimin, fled to Malaya and were given refuge by relatives. Ibrahim 
does not say whether he and the other young Malays had contacts with these com­
munists. Ib id ., p. 58. See also Ibrahim Yaacob, Sekitar Malaya Merdeka [On Free 
Malaya] (Jakarta: Kesatuan Malaya Merdeka, 1957), pp. 20-21.
6. There is some debate as to what Indonesia Raya would really have meant to 
the Malays. One view is that it would have "relegated the Malays to the position 
of inhabitants of the periphery of the planned State." In other words, it would 
represent a "diminution" of the Malays’ status. See Angus McIntyre, "The Greater 
Indonesia Idea of Nationalism in Malaya and Indonesia," Modern Asian Studies, 7, 1 
(1973), pp. 75-83. This interpretation is based on the decision of the Japanese- 
sponsored Badan Penjelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPKI—Body 
to investigate measures for the preparation of Indonesian Independence) in May 
1945 that the future Indonesian state would be unitary rather than federal and 
would embrace not only the former Netherlands East Indies but also former Brit­
ish Malaya, British Borneo and Portuguese Timor. For details of the BPKI’s 
proceedings, see Muhammad Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 
1945 [Documents on the Preparation of the 1945 Constitution] (Jakarta:
Jajasan Prapantja, 1959), 1, pp. 109-41. Rustam A. Sani, however,
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the Netherlands East Indies seemed set to go their different political ways. Before 
1941 only one Malay political association was formed which openly advocated a pan- 
Indonesian alliance. This was the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM—Young Malay 
Union), which was established in 1938 by Ibrahim Yaacob, together with several 
Malay college graduates. The KMM was registered in Kuala Lumpur in 1940, and 
thereafter it spread rapidly throughout the country.
Ibrahim Yaacob and His Idea of Indonesia Raya
Ibrahim Yaacob, the leader of the KMM, was born in 1911 at Temerloh in cen­
tral Pahang. His great-great-grandfather was a Bugis who traveled from Sulawesi 
to Riau, and from there to Pahang. Ibrahim claimed to be of the same stock as Tun 
Abdul Razak, later Prime Minister of Malaysia. He graduated from the Sultan Idris 
Training College in 1931, and got a job as language teacher at the Kuala Lumpur 
Police Depot. He became interested in journalism and wrote articles for Malay news­
papers critical of various aspects of British administration. On being informed by 
the Police Commissioner (J. D. Harrie?) that unless he stopped writing anti-British 
articles he would be transferred upcountry, he resigned his position and joined 
the daily newspaper Majlis in Kuala Lumpur, later moving to the Utusan Melayu in 
Singapore. 7
Most of the other KMM leaders were college graduates of peasant background 
who, as students, had been exposed to the ideas and politics of the nationalist and 
Islamic modernist movements of the 1920s and 1930s in Turkey, the Middle East, 
and Indonesia. But probably most important in forming the pro-Indonesian orien­
tation of these men was the fact that many of them had studied at the Malay-medium 
Sultan Idris Training College (SITC) in Tanjong Malim (Perak). The principal of 
the SITC, O. T. Dussek, although a British colonial official, was credited by one 
former student, the late historian Haji Buyong Adil, with awakening political con­
sciousness among students at the college. Adil described him as "Malaya's Douwes 
Dekker." 8 Anxious to promote the welfare of the Malays, Dussek believed that
takes issue with McIntyre and argues that there is no evidence to suggest that 
the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM—Young Malay Union) nationalists accepted an 
unequal position within "Melayu Raya" (he uses this term). See his essay, "Mela­
yu Raya as a Malay 'Nation of Intent,"' in The Nascent Malaysian Society, ed.
H. M. Dahlan (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Antropologi dan Sosiologi, Universiti Ke- 
bangsaan Malaysia, 1976), pp. 11-26. The KMM is believed to have made an 
abortive attempt in August 1945 to form an autonomous government in Malaya ow­
ing allegiance to Jakarta (apparently on the assumption that Melayu Raya or 
Indonesia Raya would be a federal structure). The move will be discussed later 
in this article.
7. Most of these biographical details are drawn from the following sources: notes 
compiled by my former colleague at Australian National University, Robert Reece 
(hereafter referred to as Robert Reece's Notes), based on an interview with Ibra­
him in Jakarta in February 1973; and the Fortnightly Intelligence Reports (hence- 
force FIR), Nos. 7, 10, 12 and 13 (covering the period May to September 1943) of 
the wartime Far Eastern Bureau, British Ministry of Information, New Delhi, in 
CO 273/669/50744/7. I shall make frequent reference to these sources, as they 
contain much of relevance to Ibrahim's activities in 1940 and 1941. Some biograph­
ical details are also found in Roff, Malay Nationalism, pp. 172-73.
8. My informant is Dahari Ali, journalist and retired politician. Interview, Kuala 
Lumpur, May 1973.
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this could be done by improving Malay vernacular education. Although the func­
tion of the SITC was to train village teachers, Dussek "encouraged the growth of 
a more literary education based on Malay language and culture."9 To overcome 
the shortage of textbooks in Malay, he purchased and used a considerable number 
of Indonesian books published by Balai Pustaka, and he set up a Malay Translation 
Bureau in the SITC, patterned on the Balai Pustaka, to translate, commission, and 
edit vernacular school and literary texts. Their imaginations fired by history text­
books from Indonesia, Buyong Adil and Abdul Hadi Hasan, a history teacher at the 
college, were encouraged to write a series of books entitled Sejarah A lam Melayu 
(History of the Malay World) for the SITC. They discussed and championed the 
concept of "Nusantara" (Malay-Indonesian archipelago) unity.10 This training and 
the attraction exerted by Sukarno from Java helped ensure that the incipient na­
tionalism of these young Malays soon assumed a secular form and lost much of its 
pan-Islamic flavor.11
In early 1938 the "first avowedly political, but still conservative" Persatuan- 
Persatuan Negeri (State Malay Associations) were formed,12 and Ibrahim Yaacob 
and Ishak Haji Muhammad joined them. They soon left, however, disgusted with 
the royal patronage of the associations, their "feudalism" and preoccupation with 
"provincial matters, ceremonies, special rights of the aristocracy, rajas and with 
those Malays whom they considered anak negeri [sub jects]."13 Malays who were 
not anak negeri could not become members of these associations, and immigrants 
from Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and the other Indonesian islands, together with 
Malays of mixed descent were, therefore, excluded. Seeing this division within 
Malay society as an opportunity to form a political association representing all 
these excluded elements, Ibrahim and other radical college graduates gathered 
enough courage to form their own party, the KMM, which they hoped would under­
mine the mass basis of the Malay State Associations. Ibrahim's awareness of the 
divisions within Malay society and of how they could be exploited is most evident 
in his book Mel that Tanah Air, written in 1941. Addressing a Malay audience who
9. Roff, Malay Nationalism, p. 146.
10. In his preface to Volume I of Sejarah Atom Melayu, dated June 1925, Abdul 
Hadi Hasan said the sources he used included Sejarah Tanah Jawa and publications 
such as Seri Pustaka and Volksalmanak Melayu produced by the Balai Pustaka in 
Java. See Abdul Hadi Hasan, Sejarah Alam Melayu [History of the Malay World] 
(reprint ed.; Singapore: MPH Publications, 1968), 1, p. v . The revival of interest 
in Malay history was responsible for turning one of Abdul Hadi Hasan's students, 
Harun Aminurrashid, into a well-known writer of historical novels. A number of 
Harun's stories were based on the Sejarah Melayu and the Hikayat Hang Tuah.
11. According to Ibrahim, he and four other college friends, Hassan Manan, A. 
Karim Rashid, Yaakub Amin, and Mohammad Isa bin Mahmud, enrolled secretly as 
PNI members. At the same time, the students formed themselves into a "socialist- 
inclined" secret society called "Ikatan Pelajar SITC" (the SITC Students' League). 
Later, they enlarged the group and called it "Ikatan Semenanjung Malaya/Borneo" 
(the Malaya Peninsula/Borneo League) to include students from Borneo. The 
"inner circle" of the League discussed how to achieve closer relations with Indone­
sia and supported the idea of a union of all Malay islands and territories within 
Indonesia Raya. Agastya, Sedjarah, pp. 60-61; see also Ibrahim Yaacob, Sekitar 
Malaya Merdeka, p. 24.
12. Ross, Malay Nationalism, p. 230.
13. Agastya, Sedjarah, pp. 67-68.
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already knew him as the KMM's president, Ibrahim there stated that the Malay peo­
ple now wanted new and strong leaders who could unite them and improve their 
livelihood. Although the people no longer desired their p impinan car a lama (tra­
ditional leadership), the princes and aristocrats still wished to lead the Malay 
race, and this hindered any new leadership from achieving prominence. Ibrahim 
urged the Malays to express their unanimous support for "a nationalist movement 
under the stewardship of a leader who could be relied upon to pursue with single- 
mindedness the cause of advancing their livelihood whenever the opportunity 
arose."
The formation of the KMM in 1938 marks an important phase in the history of 
the peninsular Malays—the arrival of a self-consciously progressive and national­
ist intelligentsia. The orientation of the organization was clearly emphasized by 
Ibrahim when he explained why he and his group called themselves pemuda and 
chose the word Muda in the name of the KMM: " . . .  Muda does not mean Youth, 
but young  in ideas, that is, progressive; thus emerged the Nationalist Progressive 
Malays who refused to agree with the narrow Nationalism espoused by the Malay 
feudalists."14 5
After establishing the KMM, Ibrahim and the other KMM pemuda attacked what 
they considered to be one of the major causes of Malay weakness and disunity: 
the "narrow nationalism" of the Malay aristocracies and their tendency to exacer­
bate the cultural and ethnic differences between the local-born Malays (anak ne- 
geri) and the recently arrived immigrant Malays (referred to as anak dagang—  
traders, i . e . , aliens). The KMM leaders also condemned the Malays' habit of clas­
sifying themselves provincially as orang Kelantan, orang Perak, or ethnically as 
orang Bugis, orang Minangkabau and orang Jawa. They called on Malays to think 
of themselves only as orang Melayu. In 1939, writing in Majlis, of which he was 
then editor, Ibrahim Yaacob appealed to the Malays to sink their ethnic differences 
in the interests of achieving overall Malay unity: "Our Malay race has no less
than 65 million people. We are, indeed, a large race but because we are weak in 
national spirit, experience and in other requirements and because our people like 
to think in terms of their ethnic groups [puak-puak] and not in terms of their 
race, the Malays have become weak and disintegrated. . . . " 16
14. See Ibrahim Yaacob, Melihat Tanah Air [Observations on the Motherland]
(Kota Bharu: Al-smaliah Press, 1941), 1 [in Jawi], pp. 10-11. All references to 
Melihat Tanah Air hereafter will be to this edition. After his two return visits to 
Malaysia in 1973, Ibrahim brought out a revised edition of Melihat Tanah Air (Kuan- 
tan: Percetakan Timur, 1975), in Rumi. This gave him an opportunity to rectify 
some earlier errors, but he also rewrote several parts of the text in an attempt to 
elucidate certain matters with the help of hindsight. There are many discrepancies 
in fact and meaning between the two editions, and students of history should treat 
the 1975 edition with care as, unlike the earlier Jawi edition, it is unlikely to re­
flect Ibrahim's political thinking in 1941.
15. The Malay text in Agastya's Sedjarah, p. 72, reads: " . . .  yang dimaksudkan
Muda itu bukannya Youth, tetapi young  di-dalam idea artinya progressive maka 
itulah timbul Nationalist Progressive Melayu yang tidak dapat persesuaian dengan 
Nationalism sempit yang dipimpin oleh kaum-kaum feodalist (Pertuanan) Melayu 
itu."
16. See the extract from Majlis, November 16, 1939 in Mohd. Taib Osman, Bahasa 
Renchana Pengarang Akbar-Akbar Melayu Hingga ka~Tahun 1941 [The Language 
of the Editorials in Malay Vernacular Newspapers up to 1941] (Kuala Lumpur:
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The ideal of Ibrahim and the other KMM pemuda was a United Malay Nation in 
which all the Malays recognized themselves as being One Race, speaking One Lan­
guage and having One Nation, very similar to the ideals of the Indonesian Youth 
Pledge of 1928 which had, in fact, inspired them.17 In other words, the KMM 
wanted to create new and wider loyalties above the level of the puak and the 
negeri (principality or kingdom). In Melihat Tanah Air Ibrahim declared that a 
perasaan baharu (new consciousness) among the 65 million Malays in British Malaya 
and the Netherlands East Indies was reflected in their distinct desire to work to­
gether in a joint nationalist movement towards Melayu Raya or Indonesia Raya. 
However, a large majority of the Malay aristocracy and royalty held steadfastly to 
perasaan lamanya (their traditional views) and strongly opposed the perasaan ba­
haru aimed at uniting the Malay people.18 Evidently one reason for Ibrahim’s crit­
icism of the Malay aristocracy was their reluctance to come together in a larger 
political entity, and their preoccupation with the question of State autonomy.19
Concurrent with their efforts towards achieving Malay unity the KMM pemuda 
were also carrying on anti-British agitation. Between 1938 and 1941 they pursued 
a policy of "noncooperation" with the colonial administration—a policy pursued ear­
lier by Sukarno's PNI (1928-31). In books and newspapers Ibrahim and his col­
leagues began a propaganda attack on the British administration and the "coopera­
tors"—the English-educated Malay bureaucrats and aristocratic groups. By 1941, 
the KMM's anti-British activities reached the point where Ibrahim established eon-
Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1964), p. 74., Note Ibrahim's tendency to think in 
terms of the whole Malay-Indonesian archipelago.
17. In his paper "Sejarah Perintis Kemerdekaan Malaysia" [The history of pio­
neers of Malaysian independence], part 1, prepared for delivery in August 1973 
to the History Department, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, under 
its oral history project, Ibrahim claimed that he and the other SITC students were 
very influenced by the ideals of the Indonesian Youth Pledge of 1928 after reading 
about it in the Indonesian newspaper Persatuan Indonesia. It was, in fact, the 
secular youth movement in Java which created and first popularized the Indone­
sian "national symbols"—the name of the country and the people ("Indonesia" and 
"Bangsa Indonesia"), the Indonesian language, the Red-White flag and Indonesia 
Raya, a song composed by W. R. Soepratman which was to become the national 
anthem.
18. Ibrahim Yaacob, Melihat Tanah Air, pp. 12-13. In his revised edition of the 
book (1975, p. 20), he explains that by "Melayu Raya" he also meant "Melayu Mer- 
deka" (Independent Malaysia).
19. Ibid. An exception was the Federated Malay States (FMS) formed in 1896, 
which brought a limited form of association among the States of Selangor, Perak, 
Pahang and Negri Sembilan. This was not a voluntary union, but one forced on 
them by the colonial power (these states had been the first to accept British Res­
idents). British attempts to persuade the other Malay States, known collectively 
as the Un-Federated Malay States (UFMS), to join the federation were unsuccess­
ful and were continually rebuffed until the Japanese occupation. The debate over 
"decentralisation" in the FMS in the 1920s centered on what powers were to be 
surrendered to each of the Federated Malay States by the British-dominated fed­
eral government, following strong criticisms by the Malay rulers that their states' 
autonomies were being eroded. In finally agreeing to decentralization, the British 
hoped to draw the UFMS into the federation. For an excellent discussion of the 
FMS in the 1920s, see Rupert Emerson, Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect 
Rule (1937; reprint University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1964).
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tacts with Japanese agents in the hope of obtaining Japanese support for KMM ob­
jectives in return for aiding Japanese plans to overrun Malaya. He hoped, too, 
that union with Indonesia could be achieved with Japanese support.
Ibrahim Yaacob—the "Double Agent"
The story of KMM cooperation with the Japanese really begins with Ibrahim's 
own desire to play the role of "double agent" (for the Japanese and the British) 
in order to advance not only his own personal interests but also the interests of 
the KMM and Malay Independence.
Ibrahim was as much the undisputed leader and moving spirit of the KMM as 
Sukarno was of the PNI. He had great charisma, but was self-centered and auto­
cratic, taking almost all decisions himself, often without consulting other members 
of the party, with the occasional exception of Onan Haji Siraj, his brother-in- 
law.20 By 1940, at the age of only 29, Ibrahim had developed into an ardent and 
radical nationalist with a particular admiration for Sukarno, his ideas and politi­
cal style—especially his oratory.
Ibrahim adopted an ambivalent attitude towards both the Japanese and Brit­
ish. 21 It is doubtful whether he ever really believed in the Japanese slogan,
"Asia for the Asians," or in any of their promises of self-government and indepen­
dence for colonial territories in Southeast Asia. It was not Japanese propaganda 
but conditions in 1940 and 1941 which encouraged him to take advantage of the 
situation for himself and for the cause of the KMM. In Ibrahim's view, the policy 
the United States, Britain and other European colonial powers were pursuing in 
the region was contradictory. On the one hand, they seemed to be appeasing 
Japan by giving in to some of her political and economic demands, thus embolden­
ing and encouraging her, but on the other they were rearming themselves to re­
sist the Japanese threat.22 With the outbreak of war in Europe, the British au­
thorities had become more alert to the growing Japanese interest in Malaya, and
20. Onan Haji Siraj was born in about 1912 in Kampung Jawa in the Kinta Valley 
of Perak. Son of a Javanese engine-driver, Onan studied at the English-medium 
Technical School in Kuala Lumpur. He was a co-founder of the KMM with Ibrahim 
Yaacob, who later married his sister Mariatun.
21. In putting forward this view, I have taken into account the opinions of Ibra­
him's colleagues, such as Mustapha Hussein and Ishak Haji Muhammad, that he was 
not only extremely self-centered but also a clever opportunist. Ishak, in fact, 
calls him "a brilliant opportunist." Interview with Ishak Haji Muhammad, Kuala 
Lumpur, January 1977. Both Ishak and Mustapha also disagree with Ibrahim's 
accounts of some KMM activities prior to the Japanese occupation. Neither, how­
ever, challenges his recollections of his contacts with the Japanese, as in these 
Ibrahim acted alone. None of his KMM colleagues had any knowledge of the meet­
ings, or of what he said or did with the Japanese. Ibrahim's accounts of those 
episodes, then, have to be relied on until contrary evidence proves them erro­
neous. It should be noted that Ibrahim's "confession" that he was a "double 
agent" was only made in 1973. He stated this in August 1973 in his paper for
the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, "Sejarah Perintis," and had "revealed" it 
privately to Robert Reece a few months earlier.
22. Ibrahim gives his views of the international situation involving Japan and the 
"ABCD bloc" (American, British, Chinese, and Dutch) in Agastya, Sedjarah, pp. 
88-91.
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they increased their surveillance of Japanese activities and their own defense 
preparations. 23 24
To Ibrahim and to other politically conscious Malays, the most disturbing 
trend was that in the years between 1935 and 1940 Siam had become friendly with, 
and increasingly dependent on Japan, raising the possibility that it might play a 
supportive role in Japanese expansionist plans for Southeast Asia. 2I* Specifically, 
they feared that the Siamese would ally themselves with the Japanese in exchange 
for the promise that the four northern states of British Malaya—Perlis, Kedah, 
Kelantan and Trengganu—would be returned to Siam after Japan had occupied the, 
country. 25
In June 1940, after a quarrel with the newspaper board over policies Ibrahim 
lost his job on Majlis. He then began a tour of Malaya to contact KMM branches 
and survey for himself the defense situation. On the coasts of Trengganu and 
Kelantan he observed that batang pisang (banana tree trunks) had been dressed 
up as shore batteries. According to his account, this convinced him that British 
defense measures could not stop the Japanese.26 When he visited the Japanese- 
owned iron mines at Dungun, Trengganu, some people there suggested to him that 
he should meet Ishikawa, a Japanese mining engineer whose office was in High 
Street, Singapore. Later in his tour he met Sultan Zainal Abidin of Trengganu 
and his Mentri Besar (Chief Minister), Tengku Setia Raja Omar who, like Ibrahim, 
had Riau connections. According to Ibrahim, both the Sultan and Tengku Omar 
raised doubts about the adequacy of British defense measures and voiced fears 
about Siamese intentions. 27 Sultan Abu Bakar of Pahang expressed similar mis­
givings when Ibrahim met him later.
Probably as a result of his meeting with the Japanese miners at Dungun, Ibra­
him conceived a plan of action (which he intended to carry out himself) to help the 
Malay people achieve what he called "a bargaining position." He took the opportun­
ity to discuss this with the rulers, both in his capacity as KMM president and as a 
journalist. As he later related: "In this situation, the KMM leadership took cour­
age and did not fear death, but endeavored to sacrifice their lives, by joining the 
world of intrigues and espionage in order to secure concessions which would give 
the Malays 'a bargaining position' to safeguard their rights and open a path which 
would lead to the achievement of Malay independence. . . , " 28 He decided to en­
23. Ian Morrison, Malayan Postscript (London: Faber and Faber, 1942), pp. 11- 
22, gives a good description of British defense measures in Singapore and on the 
mainland.
24. Agastya, Sedjarah, pp. 86-87. For a detailed discussion of the international 
situation at the time, see F. C. Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia: Its Rise 
and Fall, 1937-45 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 231-34.
25. Agastya, Sedjarah, pp. 86-87. By the 1909 Anglo-Siamese Treaty, Siam had 
ceded the four states to Britain.
26. Robert Reece's Notes. See also Volume 1 of Ibrahim Yaacob, Melihat Tanah 
Air, for general impressions of his tour. The book is critical of British adminis­
tration policies in the Malay States and gives an account of Malay history and cul­
ture, but refrains from discussing military matters. The manuscript of Volume 2 
was seized by the police when they arrested him in December 1941.
27. Robert Reece's Notes.
28. From Ibrahim's paper, "Sejarah Perintis," Part 2, typescript 7.
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gage in espionage, and he claims the sultans gave him their blessing.29 Ibrahim 
rationalized that, while other groups were working with the Japanese to advance 
their own communities' interests, such as the Indian Independence League (IIL), 
the pro-Wang Ching-wei groups, and even the Acehnese independence groups 
(some openly in Bangkok and others underground in Malaya), the Malays them­
selves had done nothing to safeguard their interests.30 The Malay rulers, al­
though aware of Japanese propaganda and of the dangerous trend in Japanese re­
lations with Siam, were resigned to relying on British military protection. Ibrahim 
therefore hoped that by becoming a Japanese agent he could gain valuable informa­
tion about Japanese activities and thus enable the Malays and the KMM to prepare 
themselves and protect their lives and future.
At the same time, however, Ibrahim was apparently also attempting to estab­
lish himself as an agent of the British. Before approaching the Japanese, he was 
involved in a project to restore the Riau Sultanate and declare it independent of 
Dutch rule. Earlier in his Malayan tour he had interested the Mentri Besar of 
Trengganu, Tengku Setia Raja Omar,in reviving his "legitimate" claims to the Riau 
Sultanate. Ibrahim stated that he possessed a 100-year-old historical document 
tracing the genealogy of the Riau Sultanate, and he aimed to end Dutch rule over 
the Riau islands by having Tengku Omar installed on the throne with British sup­
port. 31 Apparently Tengku Omar encouraged these efforts, for soon after touring 
Malaya Ibrahim went to Riau, where he tried to interest everyone he met in the 
project, including Raja Haji Yunus who had a claim to being the Raja Muda of Riau. 
Ibrahim apparently planned to make Riau a "buffer state" between Malaya and the 
Netherlands East Indies should the Dutch colonial administration capitulate to the 
Japanese as the French had done in Indochina in September 1940. According to 
Ibrahim, he wanted to make Riau the symbol of Malav-Indonesian unity and resis­
tance, allied to Britain and America against Japan.32
It is unclear exactly what Ibrahim himself hoped to gain from the materializa­
tion of this plan, but the urge to play an important role in "big power" politics 
and be the first man to propose such a plan certainly weighed heavily with him.
He related how, after his return to Singapore, when he had a further meeting 
with Tengku Omar and Raja Haji Yunus, they decided that, as British assistance 
was absolutely vital, Tengku Omar should discuss the matter with the Director of 
the Special Branch, L. M. Wynne. Ibrahim, who accompanied Tengku Omar to 
this meeting as his aide,33 34reported that the British were interested in the plan, 
for they were quite unsure what the Netherlands East Indies' reaction would be to 
Japanese pressure. Ibrahim later recounted that these meetings led to a friend­
ship between him and Wynne, who sent him to Riau in September 1941 to collect 
information on whether the Japanese would really establish themselves there.
Some time late in 1941 the British High Commissioner, Sir Shenton Thomas,3tt appar­
ently granted an interview to Ibrahim and Tengku Omar, but their plan was killed
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.; Agastya, Sedjarah, pp. 81-83; Robert Reece's Notes. The government 
of Wang Ching-wei had been established in northern China with Japanese support 
and it had local adherents in Malaya.
31. The Riau episode is described in detail in Agastya, Sedjarah, pp. 81-83.
32. Ib id ., p. 82. However, there is no corroboration of this story in British 
sources.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid. There is, however, no information on this interview in the available
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when the Netherlands East Indies finally showed that it was positively resisting 
Japanese pressure.
At about the same time Ibrahim also approached the Japanese mining engineer 
Ishikawa to indicate his willingness to become a Japanese agent, 35 and met with 
Michio Hirakawa who was "the centre of a certain Japanese intelligence organ" in 
Malaya.36 In their discussions Ibrahim suggested that his best cover would be to 
have a newspaper of his own. Further negotiations involved the Japanese Consul- 
General in Singapore, Ken Tsurumi, who, in April 1941, after obtaining Tokyo's 
approval, handed over a sum of M$18,000 to Ibrahim to purchase the Warta Malaya, 
a Malay newspaper in Singapore owned by an Arab, Syed Hussein bin Ali Alsagoff. 
With additional money from Tsurumi, Ibrahim also bought himself a ca r .37 After 
the KMM had purchased the Warta Malaya and Ibrahim had become its head, he 
assigned able members of the KMM to branches of the newspaper all over Malaya.
In September 1943 the Domei newsagency disclosed that by this means "all kinds 
of intelligence about the disposition of defence works of British troops, such as 
landing spots in Kota Bharu, fortifications on the Perak River and the stronghold 
in Klang were collected."38
In November 1941, Ibrahim's involvement with the Japanese escalated. At the 
time Major Fujiwara Iwaichi, who was attached to the 8th section (propaganda), 
Second Bureau, of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters,39 40was in Bangkok 
on a mission to help the Japanese military attache there develop his Malayan con­
tacts. Fujiwara was to work with anti-British Malay and Indian movements to en­
sure that, if war broke out, the peoples of Malaya would cooperate with the Japa­
nese Army.1*0 In late November Consul-General Tsurumi flew to Bangkok from
CO correspondence between Shenton Thomas and the British Colonial Office up to 
February 15, 1942 (the fall of Singapore).
35. Ibrahim gives conflicting accounts about which side made the first contact.
In the interview with Robert Reece, he claims it was he, but in Agastya, Sedjarah, 
p. 87, and in his paper for the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, he states that the 
initiative was taken by Japanese agents. Given the earlier contact between Ibra­
him and Japanese mining engineers in Dungun, it would appear the next move was 
up to Ibrahim.
36. This information on Hirakawa appeared in the wartime DOmei newsagency's 
report mentioning Ibrahim's contacts with him. The report said that Hirakawa ob­
tained "strong Japanese backing" for the KMM, which was "converted into an 
active secret society." When the Japanese attacked Malaya, Ibrahim was in a 
Singapore prison and Hirakawa interned in India. Hirakawa returned to Japan by 
exchange ship from India. See FIR No. 13, for the period which ended on Septem­
ber 11, 1943, in CO 273/669/50744/7. For Japanese accounts confirming these con­
tacts, see Nagai Shinichi, "The Malay Nationalist Movement During the Pacific War: 
From the Perspective of the Leftist Nationalist Leadership—Part I" [in Japanese], 
in Azia Keizai (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, October 15, 1975), pp. 
40-50; and Fujiwara Iwaichi, F Kikan [F Agency] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1966), pp. 
168-69.
37. Interview with Fujiwara, Tokyo, September 1976. See also Nagai, "Malay 
Nationalist Movement," pp. 40-50; Robert Reece's Notes.
38. See FIR No. 13, September 11, 1943, in CO 273/669/50744/7.
39. Fujiwara, interview.
40. Ibid. Fujiwara says that he was not instructed to organize the local Chinese
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Singapore to meet with Fujiwara and inform him that he needed more funds for es­
pionage work and that he had given Ibrahim additional money. Fujiwara instructed 
Tsurumi to establish a fifth column organization code-named KAME (tortoise), an 
espionage network that would include certain Japanese residents and such organi­
zations as the Indian Independence League and the KMM. He also asked Tsurumi 
to arrange for KMM members in the northern Malay States to act as guides and in­
terpreters for the invading Japanese Army, and for them to identify themselves 
by armbands carrying the word KAME. While in Bangkok, Fujiwara also held dis­
cussions with a few KMM members who later accompanied him to southern Thailand 
in readiness for the Japanese assault.1,1 According to a Malay account, the KMM's 
Kelantan state chairman, Abdul Kadir Adabi, signed an agreement with the Japa­
nese in Bangkok concerning independence for Malaya. Reportedly, this agreement 
was to be used to help the Japanese obtain Malay support against the British dur­
ing their military campaign. The source however does not state either the date of 
the agreement or whether Ibrahim had instructed Kadir Adabi to sign i t .1*2
Ibrahim has acknowledged that by late November he had already been recruit­
ed into KAME by Ken Tsurumi and other Japanese agents, but has denied that he 
instructed KMM members to act as guides and interpreters for the Japanese.1,3 His 
version of the actual agreements with Japanese agents differs in important respects 
from Japanese accounts. Tsurumi, Ishikawa and Fujiwara all claim that their aim 
was merely to get assistance from Ibrahim and the KMM for the attack on Malaya, 
and that they gave the KMM no promises of Japanese support for the KMM’s objec­
tive of Malay independence within the Indonesia Raya. **** Ibrahim, on the other 4123
as this was the role of secret agent Yuwata, a Japanese who had lived in Southeast 
Asia for twenty years and who was based in Bangkok. Yuwata's job was to try 
and work up pro-Wang Ching-wei feelings among Chinese in Southeast Asia. For 
more information on Fujiwara's work in Bangkok, see Joyce Lebra, Jungle Alliance 
(Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1971), pp. 3-4; Louis Allen, The End of the War 
in Asia (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1976), p. 134.
41. Fujiwara, interview.
42. See A. Talib bin Hj. Ahmad, Riwayat Kinta [The Story of Kinta] (Kuala Lum­
pur: Pustaka Rusna, 1959), pp. 95-96. The writer quotes Onan Haji Siraj as the 
source of the Bangkok agreement.
43. Agastya, Sedjarah, pp. 92, 97; Ibrahim, "Sejarah Perintis"; Robert Reece’s 
Notes. There is a suggestion from Pacik Ahmad, a former KMM executive commit­
tee member, that during one of his frequent trips around the peninsula, Ibrahim 
visited remote aboriginal settlements and recruited several aborigines as guides 
for the Japanese. See Abdul Malek Haji Md. Hanafiah, "Sejarah Perjuangan Kesa- 
tuan Melayu Muda, 1937-1945" [History of the Struggle of the KMM, 1937-1945] 
(B .A . Honors thesis, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1975), p. 205. This thesis 
was done at the undergraduate level, but it is an impressive work based on inter­
views with former KMM leaders, such as Mustafa Hussein, whom I have been un­
able to interview. Although there are gaps in Malek's narrative, it is the only 
source for certain episodes in the KMM's history. I am grateful to John Funston, 
formerly lecturer at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, now at the ANU, for letting 
me look at Malek's work, which he supervised. For a further reference to the 
aborigines, see Ibrahim Yaacob, Melihat Tanah Air, pp. 88-89, which also has a 
picture of him and Sakai (aboriginal tribesmen) riding an elephant. Ibrahim calls 
the aborigines orang saya (my people).
44. Fujiwara said: "I wanted to make such a promise because I felt that Japan
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hand, states that,in exchange for assurances that the Malays would not oppose 
Japanese troops when they entered Malaya, he received both money and promises 
that Malay independence would be considered in the future, that Malay sovereign­
ty, religion, and customs would be upheld, and that Malay women and property 
would be respected. The KMM also requested Japanese support for a "Union of 
Malay States" merged within Indonesia Raya. 45 46789
Apart from this, Ibrahim argues that the newspaper Warta Malaya did not 
openly side with the Japanese, but pursued a cautious editorial line, although it 
was rather critical of British policies. **6 While using the newspaper's correspond­
ents to collect information on defense matters, Ibrahim maintains he was still dis­
trustful of the Japanese and continued to keep in touch with Wynne on the one hand, 
and the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) through Sutan Djenain, an Indonesian 
communist,1*7 on the other, with regard to forming an underground anti-Japanese 
movement. Even as he was working for KAME, Ibrahim claims, he was already re­
porting to Wynne once a week. But it is not clear what these reports concerned.1*8
If Ibrahim's statements regarding his role as "double agent" for the British 
are accepted, his arrest, together with about 110 of his KMM supporters,on De­
cember 7, 1941, the day of the Japanese air and naval attack on Pearl Harbor, 
needs to be explained. By then, police interrogations had already revealed evi­
dence of KAME's fifth column work,1*9 and probably the attack on Pearl Harbor 
precipitated the British swoop. A contributory factor, according to a Malay 
source, may have been a Japanese broadcast, either at the same time or a few 
days earlier, urging Malays to rise up and support a Japanese-sponsored secret 
organization called KAME. The broadcast said KAME would "struggle to liberate 
Malays from British colonialism." KMM members thought that the British suspected 
that the KMM was the secret organization referred to in this broadcast. 50 There 
is no corroboration regarding the broadcast in British sources. However, there is
should genuinely play the role of liberator of Asia, but my army superiors over­
ruled me." Interview. Tsurumi and Ishikawa also made similar statements deny­
ing any political promises to Ibrahim. See Nagai, "Malay Nationalist Movement," 
pp. 40-50.
45. The Malay term which Ibrahim uses to describe the "Union of Malay States" 
is "Kesatuan Tanah Melayu." Agastya, Sedjarah, pp. 87-88.
46. Robert Reece's Notes. One British report, although it does not claim that 
Warta Malaya was used to spread Japanese propaganda, does allege that it was 
used for "violently nationalist propaganda and to encourage recruitment for KMM." 
It goes on: "The KMM, through its leaders, spread propaganda based on anti- 
British, Malay Republic and Pan Asiatic appeal." See "Singapore: Report for 
Security Intelligence for Planning Section: general information from 1940 and dur­
ing Japanese Occupation," April 1945, WO 220/561. It is difficult to verify Ibra­
him's statements or British claims, as no copies of Warta Malaya are extant.
47. Sutan Djenain, a member of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), fled to 
Malaya for refuge after the PKI's abortive uprisings in 1926-27. He was said to 
be a member of the KMM. See Ibrahim Yaakob, Sekitar Malaya Merdeka, pp. 24- 
26.
48. Robert Reece's Notes. There exist no known accounts by Wynne of these en­
counters. Wynne died in Sumatra during the war.
49. Monson's Notes to Keating in CO 273/671/50790.
50. Malek, "Kesatuan Melayu Muda," p. 209.
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evidence showing that by December 7 police interrogations had established that 
the Japanese consulate in Singapore had been behind the transformation of the 
Warta Malaya into a Japanese-controlled organ, and that the consulate was also 
organizing a secret society called KAME for fifth column work. In a confidential 
report the director of the Criminal Investigation Branch of the Federated Malay 
States police (possibly J. D. Dailey) also noted the coincidence of strong centers 
of the KMM with centers of Malay secret society activity, speculating that the KMM 
might have been grafted on to these indigenous secret societies.51 There is no 
indication in this report that the police had linked KAME to the KMM but, follow­
ing the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the radio broadcast, they could have 
reached the conclusion that the two organizations were one and the same.
When Ibrahim was arrested on December 7 he admitted having received M$18,000. 
from the Japanese consulate to buy the newspaper Warta Malaya for "New Order" 
propaganda and that "he had received other sums for collecting defense instruc­
tion ."52 Ishak Haji Muhammad,53 editor of Warta Malaya, was arrested at the same 
time, and a search of his premises revealed the existence of KMM agents in all 
states and settlements of the peninsula. On the basis of this information, 110 
KMM supporters were arrested in the Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangor, 
Pahang and Negri Sembilan), Malacca, Johor, and Singapore, but the Japanese ad­
vance prevented action being taken in Perlis and Kedah. 54 The men arrested were 
said to include subordinate officials and schoolmasters. Evidence was also found
51. Monson's Notes to Keating in CO 273/671/50790.
52. Ibid.
53. Ishak was born in September 1909. His father was an Acehnese who had 
studied religion for eight years, but ended up as a peasant farmer in Temerloh, 
Pahang. The third of sixteen children, Ishak went to the local Malay school,where 
he shone in his studies, and was transferred to-the Government English School at 
Kuala Lipis. After finishing his secondary education in 1930, he won one of three 
coveted scholarships offered to children of commoners to the "Malay Eton"—the 
Malay College at Kuala Kangsar (better known as MCKK) which trained young 
Malays, mainly from aristocratic families, for the elite Malay Adminstrative Service 
(MAS). After graduation, Ishak was designated a Probationary Malay Officer and 
held various posts,including Deputy Assistant District Officer (DADO), Magistrate 
Third Class,and Collector of Land Revenue. It was as DADO that Ishak first met 
Ibrahim Yaacob. In 1935 he gave up his government job because he found it re­
strictive and boring, and during the next four years he worked as a Malay lan­
guage teacher and a journalist. In 1939 he wrote a satirical novel on British rule, 
Putera Cunung Tahan [The Prince of Gunung Tahan] which became a minor clas­
sic. In 1938 his friendship with Ibrahim had led him to become a co-founder of 
the KMM and a member of its executive committee. See Abdul Latiff Abu Bakar, 
Ishak Haji Muhammad: Penulis dan Ahli Politik sehingga 1948 [Ishak Haji Muham­
mad: Writer and Politician to 1948] (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 
1977), pp. 1-27.
54. Monson's Notes to Keating on CO 273/671/50790. Monson also states that no 
arrests took place in Trengganu and Kelantan, but this is probably not correct. 
Malek's list of twenty KMM branch officials arrested in the police sweep through­
out Malaya includes members in Kelantan and Trengganu. See Malek, "Kesatuan 
Melayu Muda," pp. 210-11. This list is based on information given in interviews 
with three former KMM officials, including executive committee member Ahmad 
Boestamam, who was among those arrested.
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of connections with "Japanophile bodies" in the Netherlands East Indies. 55
Ibrahim argues that he should not have been arrested, for he had never been 
serious in Japanese fifth column work; he had been opposed to "Japanese fascism" 
until his arrest; and he left no instructions for the KMM to assist the invading 
Japanese forces but rather had urged members to make underground preparations 
to fight them. In fact, he contends that by arresting him and other KMM members 
the British made a serious miscalculation, because their action both convinced the 
Japanese that the Malay population was on their side and at the same time influ­
enced many Malays to support the Japanese. 56
KMM Pemuda as Japanese Army Guides
Soon after the arrests the British administration made last-minute efforts to 
persuade four Malay rulers to urge their subjects to remain loyal to Britain. 57 
This alarmed KMM members attached to units of the invading Japanese Army as 
guides and interpreters, who had been instructed by Ibrahim to safeguard the 
rulers as symbols of Malay unity. The KMM members feared that, after overrun­
ning the country, the Japanese might take punitive action against the rulers, and 
they therefore attempted to convince their Japanese officers that the rulers had 
been forced to act under duress. 58 Some of the rulers and princes were indeed 
potentially sympathetic to Japan, and between 1934 and 1937 many had been en­
couraged to visit there. 59
Despite the arrests of Ibrahim and some o f his colleagues, a remarkably effi­
cient KMM anti-British underground movement seems to have survived. KMM sup­
porters, such as its Kelantan state chairman, Abdul Kadir Adabi,in Kota Bharu 
and others in Perlis and Kedah—the front-line states where communications were 
severed immediately after the first Japanese attacks—reportedly came forward 
voluntarily to offer their services to the Japanese. Major Fujiwara quickly pro­
vided them with KAME armbands, which gave them protection and standing among 
Japanese troops and enabled them to save friends, relatives,and countless other 
Malays in trouble with the invading forces. 60
55. Monson's Notes to Keating.
56. Robert Reece’s Notes; see also Ibrahim Yaacob, "Sejarah Perintis." Ibrahim 
also states that plans to send him to India for internment were dropped because of 
the rapidity of the Japanese advance.
57. The rulers were those of the FMS states Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Perak,and 
Pahang. For a report of their joint statement, see The Malay Mail (Kuala Lumpur), 
December 10, 1941.
58. Malek, "Kesatuan Melayu Muda," pp. 212-13.
59. These included Sultan Ibrahim of Johor, who went to Tokyo in 1934 and was 
the subject of very special attention and compliments. He developed cordial rela­
tions with Marquis Tokugawa and his son, both of whom later offered him protec­
tion and arranged for Johor students, among them Ungku Abdul Aziz and Wan 
Abdul Hamid, to study in Japan. Raja Uda of the Malay Civil Service and Raja 
Nong of Selangor also visited Japan in 1935, and Tengku Abdul Rahman in 1937.
An attempt in 1935 to persuade the Raja Muda of Selangor to visit Japan failed, 
however, as he only wanted a loan. See Monson's Notes to Keating, 14.6.43, in 
CO 273/671/50790.
60. This is confirmed in interviews with several KMM members in Perak and
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Onan Haji Siraj was apparently the only KMM official to have received last- 
minute instructions from Ibrahim after the Japanese attack. Ibrahim had secured 
his brother-in-law's release by falsely informing the police that Onan was his 
chauffeur.61 After being freed in Singapore, Onan quickly moved up to Taiping 
to look for Mustapha Hussein,62 the KMM's vice-president, who had so far eluded 
arrest by the British. Both men established close liaison with Major Fujiwara. 
Mustapha supervised the KMM members and showed himself to be not only an able 
organizer but clear-sighted about the KMM's aims and the opportunities which the 
invasion presented the party. Complying with Japanese requests, he quickly or­
ganized KMM groups into the Barisan Pemuda (Youth Corps), whose members 
acted as guides and interpreters63 64and played an extremely important role in the 
military and social upheaval following the Japanese invasion. Pemuda groups were 
secretly assigned to seek out and save Malays in the police, in the Malay regiment, 
and army volunteers,who were likely to be massacred by the Japanese as "British 
supporters." Some pemuda were instructed to look for sultans who had gone into 
hiding and bring them back to their palaces, while others sought the support of 
Indian Independence League groups to guard against the possibility that Japanese- 
sponsored pro-Wang Ching-wei elements (consisting of Chinese, Formosans,and 
Koreans) might attack Malays, a prospect feared by Mustapha.61* As the Japanese 
troops swept through villages and towns in their advance down the peninsula, 
young Malays joined them, although by the time the Japanese army entered Singa­
pore only between 300 and 500 pemuda had reportedly been recruited.
In addition to demanding that the Japanese commanders not harm the Malay 
people and their rulers, but should rescue the detained KMM leaders as quickly as 
possible, and respect the customs, religion, property,and women of the Malays, 
Mustapha also requested that any Malay (civilian or uniformed) who was captured 
by the Japanese troops be referred to the Barisan Pemuda. Reportedly the Japa­
nese officers, especially Major Fujiwara, generally complied with these requests, 
as they realized the importance of the pemuda as guides.65
Yet a conflict of aims soon emerged between the KMM under Mustapha and the 
Japanese. According to later accounts, in January 1942, after the Japanese forces 
had entered Kuala Lumpur, Mustapha asked Major Fujiwara and other officers for 
Japanese backing for a proclamation of Malay independence, citing Japan's promise 
to liberate Malaya from British rule. When the Japanese commander challenged the
Perlis; see Malek, "Kesatuan Melayu Muda," pp. 225-30; see also Agastya, Sedja- 
rah, p. 97.
61. Ishak Haji Muhammad gives an account of Onan's release in his article "Ke- 
nangan Hidup Pak Sako No. 27" [Memories of Pak Sako], in the weekly Mingguan 
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur), July 4, 1977. "Sako," Ishak Haji Muhammad's pen- 
name, originated during the Japanese occupation.
62. Born in Matang, Perak, Mustapha was educated at the College of Agriculture, 
Serdang (Selangor). He served as an agricultural officer in Cemor, Perak, before 
being transferred to the College of Agriculture as an assistant lecturer. Mustapha 
was a member of the British "Left Book Club," and was very much attracted to 
revolutionary ideas.
63. Agastya, Sedjarah, pp. 92-96.
64. Ib id ., p. 76. Mustapha found the Indians quite sympathetic and reached an 
understanding with the IIL.
65. Malek, "Kesatuan Melayu Muda," pp. 223-48.
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KMM to come up with a Malay national anthem and flag ,66 the KMM group was only 
able, a few days later, to produce the Red-White flag of Indonesia and a hastily- 
composed anthem set to a martial air. The Japanese commanders refused to accept 
the legitimacy of these emblems, especially the flag, and told Mustapha and his 
colleagues that their request for a republic for the Malays was out of the question 
as they still had their sultans, and it was Japanese policy to back the sultans.67 
Mustapha’s disillusionment with the Japanese began from this time, and he was to 
distrust everything they did or said to him thereafter.
Ibrahim and the other detained KMM members were released by their British 
prison wardens three days before Singapore fell on February 15, 1942. At about 
the same time, two advance parties of Mustapha’s pemuda, one led by Onan Haji 
Siraj, infiltrated the British lines on the west coast of Singapore and reestablished 
contacts with Ibrahim and his group at the offices of the Warta Malaya in Cecil 
Street. 68 Some of them joined in the looting of hastily abandoned Chinese and In­
dian shophouses in order to obtain rice, sugar,and other foodstuffs, while others 
carried on with their work of rescuing Malay soldiers, policemen,and civilians who 
had gone into hiding once news of the British defeat became known.69
At a meeting of the KMM executive committee which he convened on the night 
of February 17, at a house in Bukit Timah, Ibrahim heard reports of pemuda ac­
tions and the attitudes of the Japanese officers. Ibrahim states that when he 
heard Mustapha's account of the Japanese rejection of his demand to set up a Ma­
layan republic, he criticized Mustapha for his stand, and told the meeting: "Com­
rades, Japan's present victory is not our victory. Our struggle has still a long 
way to go and we do not know the attitude of Japan. Who knows, Japan might also 
become colonialistic. . . . " 70 He turned to Mustapha and told him that he had made 
a great blunder. "You won't get a Republic. They will behead you," he said. 71 
Mustapha argued that his meeting with the Japanese officers had been a test-case 
and an "eye-opener." They could not be trusted,because they merely wanted to 
use Malays for their own ends. When Mustapha called on the meeting to adopt a 
policy of withdrawal and "noncooperation,"72 Ibrahim urged caution, stating that
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid., pp. 235-37. The Japanese administration's policy on the status of the 
sultans was to take away any political authority they enjoyed as heads of state but 
to pay them stipends and allow them to retain their position as spiritual leaders of 
Islam. See Yoji Akashi, "Japanese Military Administration in Malaya—Its Formation 
and Evolution in Reference to Sultans, the Islamic Religion, and the Moslem Malays, 
1941-45" in Asian Studies, 7, 1 (April 1969), pp. 94-100.
68. Agastya, Sedjarah, pp. 95-96. See also Ishak Haji Muhammad, "Kenangan 
Hidup Pak Sako No. 29" in Mingguan Malaysia, July 18, 1977. Ishak is bitterly 
critical of the arrogant behavior of Onan Haji Siraj when he arrived at the news­
paper office. Onan is said to have thrown his weight about, often raising his 
voice, and chiding everyone for lack of discipline.
69. Ibid, gives a very frank account of looting by KMM members and Chinese 
groups in Singapore just before the island fell to the Japanese.
70. Agastya, Sedjarah, p. 96.
71. Interview with Robert Reece, Jakarta, February 1974.
72. Mustapha's version is in Malek, "Kesatuan Melayu Muda," pp. 248-51, which 
gives a detailed account of the proceedings, based on interviews with Mustapha 
and other participants.
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Mustapha had put pressure too early on the Japanese. In his opinion the KMM 
should "wait and see,” for the situation might change and force the Japanese to 
give in to their demands. There was no point in acting hastily. Ibrahim’s argu­
ments won the day. Mustapha agreed to go along with the majority temporarily, 
but the differences which had arisen were soon to divide the KMM leadership and 
lead to Mustapha's group withdrawing from the KMM. 73 The tone of the meeting 
clearly suggests that the KMM leadership in general had become distrustful of 
Japanese intentions rather early. Ibrahim’s own disillusionment with the Japanese 
was soon to begin, and he was already very suspicious of Major Fujiwara. 74
The next day, February 18, Ibrahim began probing Japanese intentions. He 
led a KMM "diplomatic" delegation to call on Fujiwara at the Japanese military head­
quarters in Tanglin Road to "extend congratulations on Japan’s splendid victory" 
over the British forces and to offer the KMM's services. He asked the major to 
accept the KMM's gesture as proof of the support of the Malay population as a 
whole for Japan, and to disregard the belated anti-Japanese proclamations of the 
four Malay rulers, which had been a result o f "British pressure." He also re­
quested the Japanese to treat humanely the 2,000 Malay "prisoners of war" who 
were detained at a camp in Farrer Park. Fujiwara promised to do whatever he 
could to meet the KMM requests. He said that he hoped that in the operations 
against the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies the KMM would continue to give 
the Japanese forces the same valuable services they had rendered in the Malayan 
campaign against the British.75 Accompanied by Fujiwara, the KMM delegation 
then met General Watanabe, the Japanese military administrator of Malaya-Singa­
pore, and Ibrahim presented him with two requests: (a) that in view of the ser­
vices it had rendered to the Japanese the KMM be allowed to continue its activities 
as before; and (b) that the KMM be allowed to resume publication of its prewar 
newspaper, Warta Malaya. Watanabe agreed, but it was several months before the 
newspaper was permitted to reopen and, much to the annoyance of Ibrahim and 
his group, the management then came under a Japanese officer. 76
73. Ibid., pp. 132-48, 266-69.
74. Agastya, Sedjarah, pp. 97-99. Ibrahim's suspicions had first been aroused 
by stories of a Japanese guerrilla "Harimau O," who was unknown to Ibrahim but 
whom Fujiwara publicly linked with the KMM. "Harimau O" (from the Malay hari­
mau meaning tiger) was in fact Tani Yutaka, born in Malaya in 1910 of Japanese 
parents, who had taken up a career of vengeance following the death of his eight- 
year-old sister by rampaging Chinese mobs during the anti-Japanese campaign in 
Malaya in 1932. Tani had organized a bandit group of Thais and Malays on the 
Malay-Thai border and by November 1941 his exploits had come to the attention of 
Major Fujiwara's intelligence agency, F Kikan, which used him first as an espio­
nage agent and later in sabotage work behind British lines. Without Ibrahim’s 
knowledge, Tani had apparently been in contact with local KMM members and was 
said to have been quite successful in some of his assignments with KMM members, 
especially in blowing up communications centers. He accompanied the Japanese 
25th Army to Johor Bharu where he was struck with fever, dying in Johor General 
Hospital two days after the fall of Singapore. Fujiwara describes Harimau O's ac­
tivities in F Kikan, pp. 25-27. See also Lebra, Jungle Alliance, pp. 8-10. A 
Domei newsagency report of July 15, 1943 disclosed that a film "Harimau Melayu" 
(Malay Tiger) depicting "the exploits of the Japanese leader of an anti-British 
secret society" would be sent to the "Southern Regions" ( i .e . ,  Southeast Asia) by 
the Board of Information. See FIR, up to July 17, 1943, in CO 273/669/50744/7.
75. Robert Reece's Notes; see also Agastya, Sedjarah, pp. 98-99.
76. Ibid.
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Ibrahim was infuriated with the Japanese delay in rewarding him and his col­
leagues in Singapore for their help. He began to spend a lot of time on reorganiz­
ing the KMM and building up its strength, and also reportedly made plans for an 
underground KMM movement, in anticipation of future trouble with the Japanese.
He instructed Sutan Djenain, who had been freed from prison together with him, 
to return to Selangor and reestablish contacts with the Malayan Communist Party 
(MCP) and its Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). All KMM branch 
leaders had gone back to their states to reorganize their previous organizations 
at two levels—open and underground. Ibrahim and a few leaders remained behind 
in their Singapore base, but they toured the peninsula frequently and kept in con­
stant touch with the branches. 77
The Dutch administration in the Netherlands East Indies capitulated so quickly 
in March 1942 that the Japanese needed no assistance from the KMM pemuda.78 On 
about the 15th of that month the Japanese sent the KMM's Barisan Pemuda to Tan- 
jong Katong, a district of Singapore, for use as romusha (forced laborers) on con­
struction projects. Ibrahim quarrelled with the Japanese over this and the role of 
the KMM in general. He argued so heatedly that one of the Japanese officers 
slapped him, an incident that was kept secret but which Ibrahim recalled as being 
his "moment of tru th ."79
In April Ibrahim and other KMM leaders, such as Ishak Haji Muhammad, were re­
cruited into the Sendenbu (Propaganda Department), and soon afterwards were 
appointed journalists on the Berita Malai, a new Malay-language newspaper. 80 But 
because he resented being subordinate to a Japanese and not being given a free 
hand as editor, Ibrahim began to drop off from work. Apparently as a demonstra­
tion of his pique over the Japanese treatment of the KMM he boycotted a public 
ceremony held in Singapore on April 29 to mark Emperor Hirohito's birthday. At 
this ceremony he and other Malay, Chinese, Indian, and Eurasian public figures 
were to be awarded certificates of honor for services rendered to the Japanese.81 
After May, he no longer went to the newspaper o ffice .82
Instead, he began to concentrate on his duties as president of the KMM, fre­
quently traveling upcountry to give rousing speeches about the KMM's struggle. 
On May 11, Ibrahim addressed a KMM meeting at Muar (Johor), which was graced 
by the local Japanese eommander and the Malay District Officer, Datuk Othman bin 
Buang. Both were also present at a dinner the KMM branch gave that night in 
Ibrahim's honor, which was attended by 200 people.83
It was when Ibrahim returned from another Malayan tour in June 1942 that the 
Japanese administration informed him of their decision to ban the KMM, instructing
77. Malek, "Kesatuan Melayu Muda," pp. 271-74.
78. Robert Reece's Notes.
79. Ibid.
80. Fujiwara, interview, Tokyo, September 1976.
81. Robert Reece's Notes.
82. At Ibrahim's suggestion, the well-known Malay journalist Abdul Rahim Kajai 
was appointed editor of Berita Malai, either in May or June 1942. Interview, A. 
Samad Ismail, former Berita Malai journalist, Kuala Lumpur, 1973.
83. See extract from the weekly Matahari Memanchar (Muar), August 15, 1942, in 
Arena Wati, Cherpen Zaman Jepun [Short Stories o f the Japanese Occupation 
Period] (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1968), pp. 69-71.
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him to discontinue its activities and tell party branches to dissolve. 84 From this 
time the KMM's political influence declined, although Ibrahim's public position im­
proved .
The KMM and Malay Society
Between February and June 1942 the KMM's standing had been quite high at 
the village or district level of Malay society, largely because of Japanese reliance 
on local KMM members and officials in the rural areas for information and manpower. 
As a result, the organization became extremely influential, and during the first 
two months of the occupation its membership leapt spectacularly to about 10,000.
During this period KMM members emerged as the new privileged political elite, 
whose prestige superseded that of the Malay aristocracy and the British-trained 
Malay bureaucratic elite. With easy access to Japanese officers, political influence, 
information, special food rations, and allowances, they could extend protection and 
help to the Malay peasant masses and so became their new patrons. 85 Consequent­
ly, the Malay aristocracy and the Malay bureaucrats resented the KMM elite, a 
feeling that was increased by the fact that in many areas the KMM members were 
responsible for the arrest and interrogation of "uncooperative" Malay aristocrats 
and civil servants. Some indication of the resentment against the KMM can be found 
in these recollections of a member of the Malay bureaucratic elite:
The KMM officials swaggered about in the villages and in the govern­
ment offices, throwing their weight around as if they were the govern­
ment. No doubt the Malay population appreciated what they had done 
during the transitional period of Japanese takeover. They saved Malay 
lives and helped to protect Malay women and property.
But they were ill-qualified to take over the administration. Most were 
clerks, primary school teachers, and those holding junior positions in 
government service. The senior civil servants initially had to take or­
ders from them, because the Japanese Army officers relied on them for 
advice and they were also the eyes and ears [meaning spies and inform­
ers] of the Japanese. They were extremely arrogant; but later when 
the Japanese realized they could not rely on them to run the govern­
ment they turned to the prewar British-trained civil servants.86
84. Robert Reece's Notes.
85. In addition to giving protection, they were able to fulfill most requests from 
the Malay people for licenses to move goods and buy or sell rice, and for letters 
of safe conduct. See Halinah Bamadhaj, "The Impact of the Japanese Occupation 
of Malaya on Malay Society and Politics 1941-1945" (M.A. thesis, University of 
Auckland, 1975), pp. 76-86.
86. Datuk (D r.) Awang Hassan, Malaysian High Commissioner to Australia. In­
terview, Canberra, June 1978. During the Japanese occupation, Datuk Awang was 
a medical officer at Kluang (Johor). A similar attitude survives in Kampung Jawa, 
the home village of KMM leader Onan Haji Siraj. Onan is remembered there as an 
extremely influential and high-handed village administrator and "informer" during 
the Japanese occupation. One Malay account described him as "berjewa borjuis 
dan berfaham fascist pula" (a bourgeois and also a fascist). See Talib, Riwayat 
Kinta, pp. 95-96, 105-6. The writer was secretary of the conservative Persatuan 
Pemuda Melayu Perak (The Perak Malay Youth Association) which was loyal to the 
local aristocracy and a rival of the KMM.
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Open conflict between these different elite strata, however, did not material­
ize, partly because, in the interest of achieving Malay unity under KMM leader­
ship, Ibrahim encouraged the KMM to accommodate elements of the Malay aristoc­
racy and bureaucratic elite within their ranks, and enough members of the tradi­
tional elites quickly adjusted themselves to the new situation. Many joined the 
KMM, including such members of the Malay aristocracy as "Raja Shariman in Perak, 
Datuk Hamzah bin Abdullah in Selangor, Tengku Mohammad bin Tengku Besar in 
Negri Sembilan, Tengku Mohammad bin Sultan Ahmad in Pahang, Datuk Onn bin 
Jaafar in Johor, and others."87 Several were even allowed to assume leadership 
positions in KMM rural branches. The brevity of the KMM's "reign" also meant 
that real social divisions did not have a chance to develop in the competition for 
rewards and political influence in Malay society.
In fact, after the KMM's dissolution in June, the aristocratic groups quickly 
reasserted themselves and exacted revenge on the KMM. Ibrahim bitterly recalls 
the actions of these aristocrats as "betrayals":
Throughout the Japanese occupation none of the numerous prewar Ma­
lay associations [a reference to the aristocrat-led Malay State Associa­
tions known as the Persatuan-Persatuan Negeri] dared to rise to defend 
the rights of the Malays either openly or in secret. The leading raja 
and datuk [titled aristocrats] were only interested in safeguarding 
their own security. Initially they took refuge within the KMM and be­
came members of the KMM leadership in the districts. But when the 
KMM was dissolved, some of them betrayed several KMM district mem­
bers, causing the latter to be detained and tortured by the Japanese.88
The KMM was suppressed for most of the remainder of the Japanese occupation, 
until the closing months of the war in 1945. During its years of suppression Ibra­
him was unable to keep the movement intact underground or to maintain close touch 
with party elements and branches, which slowly disintegrated. KMM members, 
lacking leadership or an organization to give them political cohesion, became pre­
occupied with their own survival.
Japanese accounts indicate that the KMM's dissolution in June 1942 was part of 
a Japanese military policy aimed at discouraging political activities by any local 
group.89 It was feared that if the KMM was encouraged, then Chinese, Eurasians, 
and other groups might ask for similar privileges. Only the Indian Independence 
League (IIL) was backed because it was an India-oriented organization and was 
part of Japanese military designs for the invasion of India. There is little evidence 
to support the general assumption that the KMM's fortunes were affected by Major 
Fujiwara's posting to Burma in March 1942,90 for he, in fact, had done little for 
the KMM. Fujiwara himself says, "I did not encourage the KMM, because of the
87. Agastya, Sedjarah, p. 68.
88. Ibrahim Yaacob, Nusa dan Bangsa Melayu [The Malays and Their Islands] 
(Jakarta: Alma'arif, 1951), p. 61.
89. Interviews with Fujiwara and Professor Yoichi Itagaki, who was chief adviser 
on Malay affairs to the Japanese Military Administration in Malaya; both in Tokyo, 
September 1976. See also Document No. 1, "Principles governing the administra­
tion of Occupied Southern Areas," in Japanese Military Administration in Indone­
sia: Selected Documents, ed. Harry J. Benda et al. (New Haven: Yale Southeast 
Asia Studies, 1965), p. 2.
90. Bamadhaj, "Impact of the Japanese Occupation," pp. 93-94.
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multi-ethnic nature of Malayan society. I did not want to upset the status quo.
But I saw to it that Ibrahim and some KMM members got jobs as rewards for their 
cooperation. " 91
Ibrahim in Office
Perhaps as a move to mollify Ibrahim for the abolition of the KMM, Captain 
Ogawa, secretary to General Watanabe, the Somubucho Malai Gunsei Kanbu,92 in­
vited him, along with other community leaders, to accompany the Director-General 
on an upcountry tour from which they returned at the end of Ju ly.93 About a 
week later, Ogawa invited Ibrahim and four other KMM members to dinner, where 
he expressed sympathy with Ibrahim's complaints about Japanese treatment of the 
KMM. He suggested that Ibrahim accept a government post as adviser on Malay 
affairs to the Singapore-Malaya administration in Singapore. An advisory board 
consisting of five to six Malays would be appointed which Ibrahim could select and 
head, although its secretary would be a Japanese (a Mr. Hosai, a civilian with the 
rank of Colonel). Ibrahim recalls that as a result of discussions within the KMM's 
"inner council," consisting of Ibrahim and a few of his trusted executive colleagues, 
it was finally agreed that he should accept the appointment. 94
As adviser on Malay affairs to Director-General Watanabe, Ibrahim came very 
much into the limelight, making radio broadcasts and public speeches calling on 
Malays to cooperate with the Japanese administration and hinting that they would 
achieve their nationalist goals in the near future. He saw to it that such KMM of­
ficials as Ishak Haji Muhammad, Abdullah Kamel, Taharuddin Ahmad,and Muhammad 
Zallehudin were satisfactorily employed on the Berita Malai and other Malay publi­
cations issuing from the Propaganda Department.
Some KMM officials, however, such as Mustapha Hussein, Ahmad Boestamam, 
Idris Hakim, Abdul Kadir Adabi, and M. N. Othman did not participate, as they 
had already left Singapore before May 1942, dissatisfied with Ibrahim's leadership 
and the refusal of the Japanese to meet the KMM's demands on Malay independence. 
Ahmad Boestamam and Idris Hakim both returned to Ipoh where they worked in the 
local Propaganda Department, while M. N. Othman returned to his job with the Ma­
layan railways in Kuala Lumpur.
Mustapha's withdrawal as vice-president of the KMM had been precipitated by 
an incident in which he was kicked and slapped by a Japanese soldier because he 
got in the latter's way when trying to fix his bicycle on the road.95 Convinced by 
this that the Japanese were not only unreliable but barbaric, Mustapha wished to 
have nothing more to do with them. He had also found his KMM position untenable 
because of his differences with Ibrahim and his clique. The other three KMM exec­
utive committee members were similarly dissatisfied with what they described as 
Ibrahim's "autocratic" leadership, "arrogant" behavior, and formation of "cliques."96
91. Interview, Tokyo, September 1976.
92. "Director-General of the Japanese Military Administration (Malaya) in Singa­
pore ."
93. Robert Reece's Notes; see also Agastya, Sedjarah, p. 101.
94. Ibid. Ibrahim here claims he was forced to accept the appointment because 
the Japanese advice was "filled with threats."
95. Interview with Professor Yoichi Itagaki, Tokyo, September 1976.
96. Malek, "Kesatuan Melayu Muda," pp. 132-48, 210-11, 266-69.
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Besides an "inner circle" of KMM officials, Ibrahim was said to have his own group 
of trusted confidants, including his brother-in-law Onan Haji Siraj. His "inner 
circle" had included by turn Mustapha, Hassan Manan (KMM secretary-general), 
Abdul Karim Rashid, Ishak Haji Muhammad, Mohd. Isa Mahmud and M. N. Othman 
(all KMM executive committee members), and he was also known to have an "outer 
circle" and an "ordinary circle." KMM executive committee members Ahmad Boesta- 
mam and Idris Hakim belonged to the "outer circle" and were usually sealed off 
from policy making. 97 The public sinecures which Ibrahim finally secured in the 
latter part of 1942 and in 1943-44 went only to him and the "inner circle."
In June 1943, when Japanese Premier Tdjo, after a visit to Singapore and Thai­
land, announced in the Imperial Diet the coming independence of Burma and the 
Philippines, he also promised that the administration of the "Indonesian peoples" 
would move forward, and that political participation would be granted to the na­
tives in Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Borneo,and Sulawesi.98 This speech was welcomed 
with great enthusiasm by the Malay press. On July 28, Ibrahim led an eight-man 
delegation from Singapore and the Malay States on a three-month tour of Japan.
All the delegation were members of his Malay Advisory Board, but they included 
aristocrats whom Ibrahim had recruited to gain their support.99 The delegation 
was joined by another from Sumatra, and during the tour their activities were 
widely reported by Domei newsagency.100
Ibrahim and the Giyu gun
While Ibrahim's delegation was in Japan, Domei announced that the Japanese 
had adopted measures "to rouse Indonesians, including Malays, from the stupor 
into which they had fallen during the Dutch and British regimes." In Java they 
had initiated "the first steps in provincial autonomy" in line with Tojo's statement. 
They hoped that this would "inspire the people in Malaya to work in even closer 
cooperation with the authorities in the hope that when the time is ripe they too 
will be accorded similar privileges." Domei also remarked that Japan had brought 
"a new gospel of coexistence and coprosperity" to the Malays and that the "right 
has been restored to Malaya to determine its own future."101 These statements 
were made on August 10, 1943. On August 20, however, Japan signed away the 
four northern Malay States of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu to Thailand. 
The formal transfer of these states was made on October 18, and Ibrahim returned 
to Malaya in time to witness i t . 102
97. Ibid.
98. For the full text of Tojo's speech, see "Document No. 9," in Japanese Mili­
tary Administration, ed. Benda et a l., p. 51.
99. These were Nik Ahmad Kamil (Kelantan), Raja Sulaiman Ahmad (Selangor), 
Datuk Bandar Seremban (Negri Sembilan) and Tengku Ibrahim (Trengganu). 
Syonan Shimbun, July 30, 1943. See also FIR Nos. 7, 10, 12, and 13 (covering 
the period July to September 1943), which contain announcements and reports of 
Ibrahim's visit to Japan, in CO 273/669/50744/7.
100. Domei carried biographical details of Ibrahim and his contribution to Japa­
nese intelligence during the campaign leading to the fall of Singapore. See FIR 
No. 13, September 11, 1943, ibid.
101. FIR No. 12, August 12, 1943.
102. Ibrahim Yaacob, "Sejarah Perintis."
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Ibrahim's dismay over the transfer was apparently only alleviated when the 
Japanese told him that he had been chosen to help establish the Giyu gun (Volun­
teer Army) and Giyu tai (Volunteer Corps). The former was to be a fighting force 
used only for the defense of Malaya, while the latter was to be employed for defense 
of the coastline and the preservation of public order. These units would supple­
ment the Heiho (Auxiliary Servicemen) created by the Japanese in June to assist 
their forces in labor services. Ibrahim was instructed to organize Malay pemuda 
into both the Giyu gun and the Giyu tai, and was himself to undergo six months' 
military training in order to take command of the Giyu gun.103 104 Although the 
Japanese originally envisaged the Giyu gun as a multiracial army, it ended up 
mainly as a Malay force. Ibrahim, who had previously asked the Japanese to es­
tablish a Malay army, was quite willing to take up the appointment in the hope that 
he could convert the Giyu gun into a real military force.
The formation of the Giyu gun and Giyu tai in Malaya coincided with that of 
similar groups in Sumatra and Java. The Japanese aim was to persuade local popu­
lations to assume a role in defense against Allied attacks. They were now prepared 
to put more reliance on and trust in the local people, mainly because of Japan's un­
certain position in the war and the greater deployment of Japanese troops on the 
battlefronts in Burma and the Pacific. -
The KMM journalists on Berita Malai and other Malay publications mounted a big 
publicity campaign, including the staging of sandiwara (dramatic shows), for the 
Giyu gun, using Ibrahim's appointment as its commander to arouse the interest of 
young Malays. On Japanese urging, Ishak Haji Muhammad, who was now chief 
editor of Berita Malai,10h made speeches and broadcasts exhorting Malay youths to 
join the Giyu gun and Giyu tai. The monthly magazine Fajar Asia (Dawn of Asia) 
also made strong appeals to Malay youths to enlist:
The Giyu gun is a genuine Army which will consist only of Malays.
The recruits must be those who genuinely wish to defend their mother­
land. The second unit has already been formed and only awaits the 
arrival of more dedicated youths who are prepared to carry out their 
responsibilities to the motherland. Malay pemuda must seize this ex­
cellent opportunity to show the world that within their breasts flows 
the blood of Hang Tuah [the Malay warrior] who once reminded us:
"The Malays shall not vanish in this world." Mr. Ibrahim Yaacob who 
has been appointed commander of the Malay Giyu gun says he wishes 
to see every male Malay enlist as a soldier and establish the Army.105
Other writers in the magazine made similar appeals to Malay youths to "rise to the 
defense of their motherland." Earlier, in arguing that the Malays should prevent 
the British from landing again on Malaya, the journal declared: "The Malay keris 
[dagger] demands blood, after centuries of being locked within its sheath by the 
oppression of Western colonialism. " 106
103. Occasionally Ibrahim refers to the Giyu gun as Peta, which stands for Pem- 
bela Tanah Air (Defenders of the Motherland) and was the name of the volunteer 
army on Java. See Ibrahim Yaacob, Sekitar Malaya Merdeka, pp. 32-34.
104. In early November 1943 Ishak visited Tokyo to attend the Dai T5a (Greater 
East Asia) Journalists' Conference. During his absence the chief editor of Berita 
Malai, Rahim Kajai, died, and on his return Ishak took over the post. Interview 
with Ishak.
105. Fajar Asia (Singapore), December 1943.
106. See the article entitled "Bangunkanlah Tentera Sukarela!" [Raise the Volun­
teer Army!], Fajar Asia (Singapore), October 1943.
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In their speeches Ishak and the KMM leaders portrayed the Giyu gun as serv­
ing the cause of Malay independence, but in fact not all Giyu gun recruits were 
selected by the KMM leaders. They were also recruited, instructed, and trained 
by Japanese officers, and Ibrahim has been blamed for an arrangement whereby 
KMM leaders were denied the right to "indoctrinate" the Giyu gun .107
While Ibrahim was busy with the Giyu gun, the Japanese administration an­
nounced formation of sangi kai [regional councils] for Singapore and the other 
states to allow local participation in political administration. Only in Singapore 
were KMM members included in these councils; in the other states Malays were 
represented by titled aristocrats and senior civil servants. In Singapore, on 
Ibrahim's nomination, Onan Haji Siraj and Daud bin Mohd. Shah of the KMM were 
appointed. An important shift in policy was that more seats were given to Malayan 
Chinese on the regional councils, reversing the Japanese administration's earlier 
repressive policy towards the Chinese. This followed the recall of the hard-liner 
Watanabe in March 1943108 and the transfer of the four northern Malay States to 
Thailand, which resulted in the remainder of Malaya becoming overwhelmingly non- 
Malay in composition.109 Clearly this increase in Chinese political representation 
had been achieved at the expense of Malay interests, and Ibrahim's response was 
to move to strengthen the Giyu gun.
Recruiting proper for the Giyu gun began on December 9, 1943, and in a 1944 
New Year's Day message Ibrahim made a personal appeal to Malay youths to enlist 
in the army:
I am living in a camp somewhere in Sybnan [Singapore] undergoing 
rigorous training as a founding officer of the Giyu Gun. The Giyu 
gun and the Giyu tai will form the Giyu Hei or the Malai Protection
107. This criticism appears in A. Samad Ismail's semi-autobiographical novel,
Patah Sayap Terbang Jua, where the character Hashim represents Ishak, and 
Shamsuddin, Ibrahim Yaacob. The author describes how during the establishment 
of the Giyu gun, an Indonesian revolutionary, Mas Parjo, arrived secretly in Singa­
pore to assist the KMM. He criticizes Ibrahim's mishandling of the recruitment ex­
ercise :
"I said to him [Ibrahim], Bung [brother], get ready now. Without prepara­
tions how can you struggle? Bung, you must organize the idealist youths. You 
must educate them with our nationalism. With the aspirations of Indonesia Raya. 
With the anti-Japanese spirit. . . . "  and again, "How do we fight the British and 
the Americans if our soldiers [ i . e . , the Giyu gun] are not educated as nationalists? 
This was what I told Bung. Don't let the Japanese pick the men for the Giyu gun. 
Bung, you must pick them yourself." A. Samad Ismail, Patah Sayap Terbang Jua 
[A Broken Wing Can Fly Too] (Kuala Lumpur: Setia Murni, 1968), pp. 148-49. 
During the Japanese occupation, the twenty-year-old Samad worked as a journal­
ist on the Berita Malai. Later, he credited his political maturing in this period to 
Ishak. Interview, Kuala Lumpur, June 1973. Samad, now in detention for alleged 
communist activities, is one of Malaysia's leading writers.
108. See Yoji Akashi, "Japanese Policy Towards the Malayan Chinese, 1941-1945," 
in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 1 , 2 (September 1970), pp. 66, 78.
109. The composition of the various sangi kai is discussed in Yoichi Itagaki, "Out­
lines of Japanese Policy in Indonesia and Malaya during the War with Special Ref­
erence to Nationalism of Respective Countries," in The Annals of the Hitotsubashi 
Academy [Tokyo], 11, 2 (April 1952), p . 188.
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Army which, I believe, will symbolise the desire of every able-bodied 
Malai110 youth to serve his country.
Never in my life and during my difficult career as a leader of the 
Malai people have I felt more gratified at the prospect of being able 
to serve more actively as a soldier to defend my beloved Malai, and to 
help complete the construction of New Malai.
My training here, though rigorous, is strengthening my spirit and my 
faith, and will help to qualify me better to serve my people. . . . 111
Sometime before June 1944 Ibrahim completed his training and was given the rank 
of Lieutenant Colonel. About 2,000 Malay youths were said to have been recruited 
into a single unit with a central training camp and barracks at Johor Bharu. In 
July the Giyu gun was sent out on an anti-guerrilla operation. Although an un­
derstanding was said to have been reached between Ibrahim and the MCP/MPAJA 
prior to the operation, this did not prevent their forces from clashing in the jun­
gles of Kota Tinggi, with the result that twenty-five guerrillas were killed.112 
During another operation in Ipoh, however, Japanese suspicions of the Giyu gun 
were said to have been aroused, for not a single engagement occurred between the 
Giyu gun and the MPAJA. The Giyu gun unit was suddenly withdrawn to Singa­
pore and its officers and men dispersed among different Japanese Army units, and 
from then on Japanese distrust and tight control rendered the Giyu gun impotent.. 
Although Ibrahim was made an adviser and promoted to the rank of Colonel, he 
had little power.113 14
As a military officer, Ibrahim's movements were now restricted, but he still 
tried to keep in touch with the KMM officials in Singapore. By this time, as the 
result of a tiff with Onan Haji Siraj, Ishak Haji Muhammad had given up his job as 
editor of Berita Malai. He left for Bintan Island, south of Singapore, some time 
in 1944, ostensibly to help the "grow more food" campaign there. Ibrahim recalled 
him to Singapore,lll+ but he soon went back to his kampung in Pahang, where he 
remained until the Japanese surrender. Ishak's disillusionment, which was aggra­
vated by the KMM's failure to make any political headway, is nicely captured in 
Samad Ismail's novel. The character Hashim ( i .e . ,  Ishak) says:
People like us are no longer of any value. We are nationalists. So 
long as we remain so, we will be neglected. If we try to be active, we 
are obstructed. If we oppose, we lose our heads. Shamsuddin [i .e ., 
Ibrahim] knows. He wanted an Army. The Japanese said, why not?
But Shamsuddin has no authority. His Army is not a political Army.
It's an Army instilled with the Bushido spirit to serve only the Japa­
nese. Now he regrets. He tries to reorganize his front. I said,who
110. "Malai" in Japanese means either "Malay" or "Malaya."
111. Syonan Shimbun, January 1, 1944.
112. Malek, "Kesatuan Melayu Muda," pp. 297-302.
113. Agastya, Sedjarah, p. 106. It should be noted that Ibrahim's rank of 
Colonel was one of the highest ever accorded to a non-Japanese officer.
114. Ishak disliked Onan for his arrogance and said that Ibrahim gave him "too 
much face." When Ishak was in Bintan, Ibrahim repeatedly called him to return, 
but to no avail until he sent a close friend, Pacik Ahmad. Interview, January 
1977. For Pacik Ahmad's account, see Appendix D, Malek, "Kesatuan Melayu 
Muda," pp. 363-67.
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will now believe you any more? Every plan of ours has failed. Every 
effort of ours is half completed. We don't have enough people. The 
old comrades are scattered. It's now easy to select new people. We 
can't choose people who are pro-British. We can't choose people who 
are full of sympathy for the Japanese, either. We must only choose 
people who are pro-us. . . . 115
The KRIS and Indonesian Independence
As the Japanese war situation deteriorated the political advancement promised 
by Tojo was taken a stage further by his successor, Koiso. On September 9,
1944, Koiso promised to prepare the territories of the former Netherlands East In­
dies for independence, with Java to be given priority.116 In the early months of
1945, the KMM group, inspired by developments in Java where Sukarno and other 
nationalists were being given greater scope, revived their pan-Indonesian aspira­
tions. In their Malay newspapers and magazines they began to give support to 
the idea of Indonesia Raya.117
When the Japanese accelerated their plans for Indonesian independence in May 
1945, two Japanese civilian officers in the Malayan Military Administration sympa­
thetic to the KMM decided to support the Indonesia Raya idea and informed the 
group of the Japanese plans for Indonesian independence. These officers were 
Yoichi Itagaki, of Hitotsubashi University, a specialist in Malay affairs, and his 
superior, Professor Akamatsu, head of the Malayan Military Administration's Re­
search Bureau.118 Itagaki was among the officers who attended the meeting of 
Japanese administrators from Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Malaya held in Singa­
pore on May 2-3, 1945, to discuss preparations for Indonesian independence. 
According to Itagaki, while the meeting was under way he derided to act, and, with 
permission from the Chief of Staff in Singapore, he personally instructed Ibrahim 
to convene an urgent meeting of his group.119
The meeting at Ibrahim's house in Tanjong Katong, Singapore, on May 4 or 5, 
1945, was attended by about seven or eight KMM members, including Onan Haji 
Siraj. Itagaki began:
What I have to say tonight is unofficial, but I think the independence 
o f Malaya is coming. To be ready for this, you should all start making 
preparations. Today I have secured the permission of the Chief of 
Staff, so that Ibrahim can function as leader of the Malay nationalist 
movement. I hope you will all think seriously about the idea.120
Ibrahim replied:
115. Samad Ismail, Patah Sayap Terbang Jua, p. 201.
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in Japanese Military Administration, ed. Benda et a l ., p. 120.
117. See the issues of Fajar Asia from December 1944 to February 1945, which 
carried articles on Sukarno, such Indonesian historical heroes as Diponegoro, and 
the Indonesian national anthem "Indonesia Raya."
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119. See the account in his memoirs, Azia tonb Taiwa [Dialogue with Asia] (Tokyo: 
Shinkeigen Sha, 1968), pp. 158-61.
120. Ibid., pp. 161-62.
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Independence of Malaya has been our desire for a long time, but it 
has been totally suppressed by the Japanese administration. Of 
course, we believe the words of Professor. However, we cannot re­
ply immediately. We cannot start anything without Mustapha Hussein, 
the vice-chairman of KMM. If there is no agreement from Mustapha; 
there is no hope of success. To mobilize 800 comrades, his support 
is indispensable. To make matters worse, he has been insisting that 
he would not cooperate with the Japanese since the incident in which 
he was kicked and slapped. 121
Itagaki expressed regret for the incident and promised to accompany Ibrahim 
to Taiping, where Mustapha lived, to persuade him to rejoin the movement. The 
KMM group withdrew briefly for a private discussion. When they returned, Ibra­
him announced that they had picked on the name KRIS or Kekuatan Rakyat Istime- 
wa (literally Special Strength of the People) for their movement.122 Ibrahim sub­
sequently referred to KRIS as "Kesatuan Rakyat Indonesia Semenanjung" (The 
Union of Peninsular Indonesians).123 A third interpretation of KRIS is believed 
to be "Kerajaan Ra'ayat Indonesia Semenanjung" (The Government of Peninsular 
Indonesians). 124
Some time after this meeting Itagaki and Ibrahim left for Taiping, where Ibra­
him contacted Mustapha. The latter, however, refused to join KRIS, as he did not 
believe Itagaki's assurances that Japan would grant independence to Malaya. Both 
Itagaki and Professor Akamatsu met Mustapha to try to convince him, and they 
then arranged for the whole group to meet with General Umezu, the new Somubu- 
cho Malai Gunsei Kanbu. At Itagaki's request, Umezu, who shared the two pro­
fessors' sympathies for the nationalist movement, agreed to do what he could to 
persuade Mustapha.
At their meeting, Umezu made an immediate impact on Mustapha when he said: 
"I wish to speak honestly with you all today. Our policy towards the Malay na­
tionalist movement all this while has been wrong. We realize this too late. We 
must change our policy. We should now do our best to respond to your national­
istic desires. Although the war is still on, we must do our best to implement this 
policy ."125 Itagaki, who was interpreting, recalls that he noticed a sudden trans­
formation in Mustapha's demeanor. He was smiling. Later Mustapha told Itagaki 
he had been impressed by Umezu's sincerity, especially his admission of the Japa­
nese mistake. This, he claimed, few Japanese would ever do. When the group re­
turned to Itagaki's residence they became exuberant and began dancing and sing­
ing. Tears welled up in Mustapha's eyes .126
Between May and July Ibrahim tried to form KRIS branches throughout Malaya. 
He attempted to use former KMM branches as nuclei, but found that their officials 
were now scattered and disorganized, and he spent much time looking for them and
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibrahim Yaacob, Sekitar Malaya Merdeka, p. 28. According to Professor 
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recruiting new members. However, he did succeed in setting up several branches 
of about ten members each. In July, in order to make sure that Malaya was in­
cluded in the Indonesian program for independence, Ibrahim sent three represen­
tatives to meet with Sukarno. They conveyed a message from Ibrahim and the 
Malay pemuda requesting that Malaya be included within the coming Indonesian 
nation.127
In Jakarta the 62-member Badan Penjelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan In­
donesia had been inaugurated on May 28, 1945 with Japanese approval. In mid- 
July it discussed the boundaries of the future Indonesian state and whether these 
should include: (1) just the former Netherlands East Indies; (2) the former Neth­
erlands East Indies plus Malaya, New Guinea, North Borneo, and Portuguese Ti­
mor; or (3) the former Indies minus New Guinea. Muhammad Yamin advocated 
Indonesia Raya, the second alternative. In supporting him Sukarno revealed that 
three young pemuda from Singapore had arrived in Jakarta with a request for Ma­
laya’s inclusion within Indonesia. Sukarno also reported that a well-known Malay 
leader, "Lt. Colonel Abdullah Ibrahim" ( i . e . , Ibrahim Yaacob), had made a similar 
request.128 Although he recognized the political risks involved in including Ma­
laya within Indonesia, Sukarno said that the interests of Indonesia's defense and 
sovereignty required territories on both sides of the Straits of Malacca to be in 
Indonesian hands. Put to a vote, the second alternative was approved by 39 
votes, with 19 going to the first proposal and 6 to the third. Mohammad Hatta, 
who was in favor of the first proposal, said he did not object to Malaya's inclusion 
if it was so inclined.129
On July 29, a second meeting of Japanese regional administrators in Singa­
pore discussed the necessity of accelerating the program of Indonesian indepen­
dence. Itagaki recounts that after this meeting he was convinced that no more 
time should be lost by the KRIS organizers, as Indonesian independence was immi­
nent. He suggested to Ibrahim that an All-Malaya Pemuda Conference be held on 
August 17 and 18 at the Station Hotel in Kuala Lumpur to inaugurate KRIS. The 
meeting would declare KRIS support for Indonesian independence, express the 
Malay people's wish for union with the Indonesian people, and would approve a 
delegation to attend the official independence ceremony.130
Ibrahim made intense preparations for the Pemuda Conference throughout the 
first two weeks of August, dispatching agents to every state to invite KRIS 
branches and interested Malay bodies to send delegates to the conference. At 
the same time, it is claimed, he was planning to set up an interim government in 
Malaya to coincide with the declaration of Indonesian independence. Included in 
its cabinet were to be the sultans of Perak, Pahang,and Johor as well as the aris­
tocrats Datuk Onn bin Jaafar, Datuk Abdul Rahman (Johor), Datuk Hussein Mohd. 
Taib (Pahang),,and Raja Kamarulzaman Raja Mansor (Perak).131 It was also decided
127. See Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, 1 , pp. 205-6.
See also G. S. Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Inde­
pendence" (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1967), pp. 210-11, 319.
128. Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, 1, p. 206.
129. Ibid., p. 212.
130. Itagaki, Azia tono Taiwa, pp. 167-69.
131. For the names in the cabinet, see Malek, "Kesatuan Melayu Muda," pp.
302-7, who is the only source for this information. It is believed that the sultans 
agreed to the formation of KRIS, but when the question of forming a government
113
that an eight-man delegation would be sent to attend the Indonesian independence 
ceremony, consisting of four sultans and four KRIS officials (Ibrahim, Dr. Burha- 
nuddin, Onan Haji Sira]', and Hassan Manan). Ibrahim consulted Sultan Abdul 
Aziz of Perak,who agreed to be a member.132
In the midst of these preparations Ibrahim and Itagaki went to Taiping to dis­
cuss their plans with officers of the 29th Army, including General Umezu, the 
SQmubucho, who reportedly gave his full approval to the KRIS program. A key 
Malay source claims that the idea of forming an interim government was casually 
raised with Umezu, while more detailed plans on cabinet members were kept se­
cret. 133 134 (Neither Ibrahim nor Itagaki mentions the proposed formation of a cabi­
net or an interim government in their writings.)
On August 8, an Indonesian delegation headed by Sukarno and Hatta stopped 
over briefly in Singapore on their way to Saigon for talks on Indonesian indepen­
dence with Field Marshal Terauchi, the Supreme Commander of Japanese forces in 
Southeast Asia. Hearing of the visit, KMM supporters raised the Red-White flag 
of Indonesia atop the Cathay cinema building in Singapore, and KMM officials, in­
cluding Onan Haji Siraj, Hassan Manan, and Pacik Ahmad, went to the airport to 
meet the Indonesian leaders. Ibrahim was then in Taiping, and after the depar­
ture of the Indonesian delegation Hassan Manan and Pacik Ahmad went there to 
report to him, leaving Onan Haji Siraj in Singapore.
Returning after their talks with Terauchi, the Indonesian delegation on Au­
gust 12 or 13 stopped in Taiping131t—apparently to meet Ibrahim. Ibrahim, Itaga­
ki, and the KMM officials who had arrived from Singapore went with General Umezu 
to welcome the party. Sukarno's delegation and Ibrahim lunched with Umezu at 
his residence and then returned to the airport where the Indonesians held discus­
sions with Ibrahim and the KMM pemuda from which Itagaki was excluded.135 Ac­
cording to Ibrahim's account, he reported to Sukarno and Hatta that the Malays 
desired to achieve independence for Malaya (excluding Singapore) within Indone­
sia Raya. He proposed, too, that "Malayan independence" be proclaimed at the 
end of August ( either at the same time as or after the Indonesian proclamation), 
and that an eight-man delegation including himself and Sultan Abdul Aziz of Perak
to be called "Kerajaan Ra’ayat Indonesia Semenanjung" (The Government of Penin­
sular Indonesians) was broached, the sultans balked. See Arena Wati, Cherpen 
Zaman Jepun , p. 26n.
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attend the independence ceremony in Jakarta. Sukarno, with Hatta next to him, 
was apparently overcome by Ibrahim's enthusiasm. He shook Ibrahim's hand and 
said: "Let us create one motherland for those of Indonesian ethnic stock." Ibra­
him replied: "We Malays will faithfully create the motherland by uniting Malaya
with an independent Indonesia. We Malays are determined to be Indonesians."
The aircraft carrying the Indonesians then made a brief stop at Singapore for the 
second time, and at a further meeting with Onan Haji Siraj both sides repeated 
their hopes and expectations regarding Indonesia.136
There are conflicting versions of Hatta's reaction to Ibrahim's proposal to in­
clude Malaya within the Indonesian state. According to Itagaki, "Ibrahim later 
told me Sukarno showed an appreciation of his proposal, but it was Hatta who wel­
comed it wholeheartedly. This was an idea which Hatta had always advocated."137 
On the other hand, another source claims that two representatives of the Sultan 
of Johor, Major Datuk Haji Muhammad Said and Musa bin Yusof (Pak Lomak), who 
were also present at the Taiping meeting, recalled that Hatta and another member 
of the Indonesian delegation (not identified, possibly Dr. Radjiman Wediodining- 
rat) rejected the Indonesia Raya union idea.138 The latter account seems more 
probable, as it conforms with Hatta's vote at the BPKI meeting in mid-July. In 
contrast to his glowing admiration for Sukarno, Ibrahim has nowhere shown any 
affection for Hatta. (Probably reflecting the lack of importance Hatta attached to 
the KRIS union idea, he has not referred to the proposal in his own memoirs of 
the period.)
Meanwhile, the Station Hotel in Kuala Lumpur had become a hive of activity 
with pemuda representatives arriving from various parts of the country. Appar­
ently in anticipation that plans for Malayan independence within Indonesia Raya 
might include their territories as well, delegates also arrived from Patani (south­
ern Thailand) and the Riau Islands, south of Singapore. Datuk Onn Jaafar from 
Johor was among the delegates, as were the lawyer Sardon Haji Jubir and A.
Sam ad Ismail, both from Singapore. Sardon recalls that most of the pemuda had 
difficulty in getting through to Kuala Lumpur because of MPAJA roadblocks. Sar­
don himself,who was traveling with Tengku Hussein, president of the Singapore 
Malay Welfare Association, and two Japanese, was stopped outside Kuala Lumpur 
by the MPAJA, but managed to get through. A. Samad Ismail claims that his train 
was derailed by MPAJA guerrillas so that he only arrived for the conference on 
August 17.139
On August 15, news of the Japanese surrender became known, and Itagaki in­
formed Ibrahim of it when they were traveling by car to Kuala Lumpur. As Itagaki 
recalls,
He [Ibrahim] was not surprised,because he had some hint of it from his
KMM colleagues. I told him, "Japan can no longer help your movement
or you or your people's aspirations. What do you intend to do now?"
He said, "Please ask the Somubucho in Singapore to provide me with a
136. Ibrahim Yaacob, Sekitar Malaya Merdeka, p. 29, and Agastya, Sedjarah, pp. 
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plane. I want to escape to Java." I told Ibrahim, "If you want to be 
the future leader of Malaya, you should never run away from the moth­
erland. You must hide yourself in some place in the country.
"Some social disturbances will occur. Try and conceal yourself mean­
while. Jawaharlal Nehru and Gandhi were arrested by the British, 
but they were never killed. The British do not kill political prison­
ers." He uttered no sound, but merely looked out the window. Final­
ly he said, "When we reach Kuala Lumpur, I will discuss with my 
friends and I will then inform you of my final plans. " 11*°
On reaching Kuala Lumpur, Ibrahim convened an emergency meeting of the 
KRIS committee on either August 15 or 16 instead of on the scheduled August 17.11*1 
At that meeting the delegates focused on three major issues: the first was whether' 
to push through Malayan independence within Indonesia Raya; second, how to pre­
vent Chinese MPAJA domination of the country and safeguard Malay rights within 
the administration; and third, how to resolve the stigma of collaboration which 
hung over the KRIS delegates. Dr. Burhanuddin called on the Malay pemuda to 
resist the British landings, m  which, though then expected on August 20,did not 
actually begin until September 2. Rumors that the landings were imminent added 
a note of special urgency to the discussions. Apparently at Ibrahim's suggestion, 
the meeting decided that he and two other KRIS officials should leave immediately 
for Singapore where the Malay Giyu gun was based, to arrange for units to move 
to the mainland and start the armed struggle against the British. Ibrahim and 
his colleagues would then leave for Jakarta to attend the Indonesian independence 
ceremony, and Dr. Burhanuddin would take over as KRIS chairman in Ibrahim's 
absence.11*3 The most important of the twelve resolutions reportedly adopted at 
the meeting was that the establishment of the government of Malaya Demokratik 
Rakyat (Democratic People's Malaya) should be proclaimed over the radio stations 
at Penang and Kuala Lumpur. The new cabinet would be led by Sultan Abu Bakar 
of Pahang, who would also be the Head of State, and it would include Sultan Ab­
dul Aziz of Perak, Sultan Musa Uddin of Selangor, Datuk Onn bin Jaafar of Johor, 
Ibrahim Yaacob, Mustapha Hussein, Hassan Manan, Dr. Burhanuddin Al-Helmy,
A. Karim Rashid, and Ishak Haji Muhammad.11*1' Many names were included with­
out their owners' prior agreement and the meeting appointed two delegates to ap­
proach the nominees for their consent. Once this had been obtained Ibrahim was 
to be informed in Singapore. The meeting finally decided to instruct KMM pemuda 
throughout the country to destroy quickly all oil installations, airfields, bridges 
and telecommunications lines to prevent these from falling into British hands, and 14023
140. Itagaki, Azia tono Taiwa, pp. 169-74.
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some pemuda groups were also ordered to raid Japanese arms depots to seize weap­
ons for the impending armed struggle against the British. When the meeting closed 
Ibrahim left for Singapore.11*5
On the night of August 17 KRIS supporters held a reception at a house in Kam- 
pung Bharu, a Malay district of Kuala Lumpur, attended by about twenty people, 
including Itagaki and his colleagues, Yamada Hideo and Professor Ono Seizaburo. 
Itagaki told the gathering that it had been intended that the birth of the KRIS 
movement would be a prelude to Malayan independence within Indonesia Raya,
"But I am sorry that that scheme has been totally disrupted by the Japanese sur­
render. . . . Malayan independence is now your problem. You are on your 
ow n."11*6 Dr. Burhanuddin, the acting KRIS chairman, made an impassioned 
speech, which was well received, declaring that KRIS would carry on the struggle 
to achieve Malayan independence through Indonesia Raya. Datuk Onn bin Jaafar, 
however, struck a note of discord when he urged the Malays to think carefully 
before talking of Malay independence. "We must improve our economic standards 
first," he said. "We must make use of Malay lands, build up agriculture and es­
tablish cooperatives. We must endeavor to achieve economic independence first."11*7
When news arrived that the Indonesians had already proclaimed their indepen­
dence without previously informing KRIS, the initial reaction of the KMM pemuda 
was surprise. Uncertainty also set in and inhibited initiative. The KMM had 
drawn up elaborate plans to take over Japanese military installations and public 
buildings, but now only small groups of pemuda moved independently to carry 
them out. Most of the young Malays were too shocked and confused to act, and 
efforts to oppose the British without Japanese or other support soon began to col­
lapse. Some pemuda representatives returning by train to Singapore came under 
attack from the MPAJA guerrillas, with one of the coaches of their train being de­
railed. When they eventually completed their journey most of the KRIS delegates 
dispersed to their home towns to await the return of the British, when many, such 
as A. Samad Ismail, were arrested.
On his arrival in Singapore, Ibrahim was instructed by Japanese army head­
quarters to disband the Malay Giyu gun. Realizing that Japanese support for his 14567
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Indonesia Raya idea had now collapsed, he reportedly made contact with Chinese 
in the MCP, proposing that the Giyu gun join with the communist MPAJA to fight 
both the Japanese and the British. Ibrahim claims that both the MCP and the KMM 
had earlier agreed to this in principle.llt8 According to his account, on August 19, 
without waiting to hear from the MCP, he sent a 280-man regiment of the Malay Giyu 
gun under Major A. Manaf, Captain Zakaria, and Lieutenant Mohd. Said to Kuala 
Lumpur to place themselves under MPAJA headquarters. However, the Malay 
troops were stopped at Muar (Johor) by the MPAJA, and on August 22 the officers 
were forced to disband their forces because the MCP had rejected Ibrahim's offer 
and adopted a policy of cooperation towards the British. The MPAJA had decided 
not to resist the returning British because the Allied radio in New Delhi had broad­
cast a statement of the British government's intention to establish a democratic 
government in Malaya on their reoccupation of the territory.ll*9 In other words, 
of its own accord the MCP had decided to set aside revolution in Malaya. This de­
cision did not mean that the MCP had rejected cooperation with the KMM. In fact, 
under its broad united front strategy, it apparently gave support to the KMM in 
its struggle for Indonesia Raya after the British return, though the KMM's aims 
were clearly in opposition to the MCP's own goal of a communist republic in Malaya. 
Ibrahim later paid tribute to the MCP and MPAJA for shielding many KMM and Giyu 
gun members from arrest by the British Army.148 950 15
The disbanded 280-man Giyu gun regiment joined other Malays in the inter­
racial clashes with the Chinese which erupted in the Muar and Batu Pahat (Johor) 
areas, and some Giyu gun soldiers were able to acquire more arms from their Jap­
anese superiors, who apparently were only too happy to see the Malays fighting 
the Chinese-dominated MPAJA in these clashes.15f
Ibrahim was unaware of these developments, for on August 19 he left for Ja­
karta aboard a Japanese aircraft, accompanied by his wife, his brother-in-law, 
Onan Haji Siraj, and Hassan Manan. His departure compounded the confusion of 
the pemuda and meant that he abandoned leadership of the Malay independence 
movement at a time when he was critically needed. His hasty exit is still the sub­
ject of heated controversy among his KMM colleagues, with some even accusing 
Ibrahim of cowardice, while others argue, as did Ibrahim, that by going to Indo­
nesia he was continuing the struggle for Indonesia Raya.152 153 When he arrived in 
Jakarta, Sukarno told him: ''The union idea including Malaya is not convenient, 
as we would have to fight both the British and Dutch at the same time," but ad­
vised that he and his colleagues join in the struggle in Java to achieve the aspir­
ations of Indonesia Raya.159
148. Ibrahim Yaacob, Sekitar Malaya Merdeka, pp. 33-34. However, there is no 
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Dr. Burhanuddin, whom Ibrahim had had appointed his second-in-command in 
Malaya, lacked Ibrahim's charisma in the eyes of the pemuda. Nor had Ibrahim 
left him clear and specific instructions. As a result, although the KMM pemuda, 
like their Indonesian counterparts, were poised for militant action, their uncer­
tainty and confusion led to chaos. At least six groups were hastily organized in 
different parts of the country, such as Ipoh, Taiping, Kota Tinggi, and Singapore. 
They attacked Japanese arms depots, seizing weapons for the resistance struggle 
they had been told to expect against the British. With the collapse of the KMM 
plan for armed struggle, however, they smuggled the arms to the Indonesian is­
lands of Karimun and Batam. The Giyu gun leader Major Manaf escaped to East 
Sumatra to join the Indonesian armed struggle, dying in battle against the Dutch 
at Tanjung Batu, Pulau Karimun.15lt
Malay disillusionment with the KMM was a setback to the movement's hopes to 
head the independence struggle. With the exception of the troubled areas of Muar 
and Batu Pahat, where the Malay population welcomed elements of the disbanded 
Giyu gun, Giyu tai, and Heiho units in the fight against the MPAJA and the Chi­
nese, most of the Malay pemuda were stoned and abused as they returned to their 
villages. They in turn focused their anger on their sponsors, who were well known 
as "anak-anak Fujiwara" (Fujiwara's children)—Ibrahim, Onan Haji Siraj, and other 
KMM leaders. They began to curse their sponsors as penjual romusha (sellers of 
rQmusha), and tried to hunt them down.154 55 The taint of collaboration with the 
Japanese, however, involved all strata of Malay society, including the rulers, and 
could not be erased. In addition, the political threat posed by the Chinese and 
the MPAJA guerrillas soon impelled the Malays to close ranks.
Conclusion
Probably the best summary of the reasons for the failure of Ibrahim Yaacob's 
struggle for Indonesia Raya comes from Ibrahim himself:
. . .  all the efforts eventually failed, because the Malay nationalist 
movement was not mature and strong enough to master the situation 
in Malaya,which had become a cosmopolitan territory. The writer,who 
held the post of leader,himself quickly escaped to Java, intending to 
continue a more effective struggle there, but was overcome with nu­
merous difficulties. Consequently,all the events that occurred took the 
course they did. In fact, every possible step was taken to defend the 
national rights of the Malays. But the struggle continues.156
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Ibrahim became active in the Indonesian independence struggle and later joined 
Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perdjuangan.
154. Agastya, Sedjarah, p. 139. Ibrahim Yaacob dedicates his book Nusa dan 
Bangsa to Giyu gun leader Major Manaf and also to Capt. Abdul Karim Rashid, 
Capt. Ramli bin Hj. Tahir, and others who were arrested by the British and sub­
sequently released. Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan, p. 275, also pays 
tribute to Manaf's sacrifice. KMM supporters who were arrested also included 
Abdullah Thani alias Ahmad Boestamam on charges of collaboration.
155. Ibid., p. 276. Nasution comments ironically that in Indonesia, by contrast, 
the sponsors of the romusha on Java became national leaders and "heroes" of the 
independence struggle.
156. Ibrahim Yaacob, Nusa dan Bangsa, pp. 62-63.
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In fact, this is a rather honest assessment of Ibrahim's own role. To be fair to 
him, he was not always in control of the situation.
Ibrahim's dream of Malay independence through Indonesia Raya had led him 
and his KMM supporters in 1941 and early 1942 to assist the Japanese military 
against the British, but after their victory the Japanese banned the KMM, fearing 
a premature flare-up of Malay nationalism. The goal of Indonesia Raya was de­
layed, as it was not yet a desirable objective of Japanese policy. This factor 
checked the KMM's initial growth as a mass movement, and later the movement 
collapsed totally.
Lacking either a legal political organization or an efficient underground move­
ment, and unable to utilize the Malay Giyu gun under his command for his own 
goals, Ibrahim was forced increasingly to rely on Japanese support to realize his 
political aims.
Japan's deteriorating war situation and evolving Japanese plans to grant Indo­
nesian independence gave Ibrahim the opportunity for which he had been waiting. 
Itagaki's last-minute initiative to revive Ibrahim's Indonesia Raya movement en­
abled Ibrahim and his KMM group to reactivate themselves under a new name, 
KRIS. Only at the end of July 1945, however, after both Itagaki and Ibrahim 
had obtained approval from Japanese military commanders, could preparations to 
launch KRIS begin. This did not allow sufficient time for the KMM pemuda to or­
ganize themselves for action—either to establish an interim government following 
the expected declaration of Indonesian independence, or subsequently to wage 
armed resistance against the British. News of the Japanese surrender, then, 
caught them in mid-stream, with KRIS still unborn.
Withdrawal of Japanese support for the Indonesia Raya project undermined 
Ibrahim's confidence. His flight to Jakarta meant that he abdicated his leadership 
and abandoned his supporters. It ushered in depression and stagnation among 
their ranks and led to the collapse of the Indonesia Raya movement.
In his years of exile Ibrahim found the memory of defeat bitter, and he blamed 
the Japanese for his flight to Jakarta. He began to cast himself as a tragic hero. 
Concealing himself under a new name, Agastya, he reminded people that he was 
his country's lost leader:
Where is IBHY this well-known pen-name in Malaya before the war]?
Where has he gone? These are questions which are generally asked, 
but people can only guess. He was with the leaders of India, Burma, 
and Malaya who were in the custody of the Japanese when the latter 
surrendered. He was forcibly taken away from Malaya for their own 
designs. If Ibrahim Yaacob and his friends, especially the Giyu gun, 
had remained in Singapore, the nature of the struggle in Malaya today 
would certainly be different. But Ibrahim was missing, the Giyu gun 
was in disarray,and the leadership disintegrated. Japan, which was 
responsible for law and order to the Allied Powers, was aware of the 
dangers if IBHY, the Giyu gun commander and regarded as the Malay 
Progressive leader, was left in Malaya. Thus it should be no surprise 
why he was taken away from Malaya. But where is he? His home­
coming is still awaited by the Malays.157
157. Agastya, Sedjarah, p. 138. It should be noted that in his other accounts 
about his flight to Jakarta, written under the name of Ibrahim Yaacob, he does 
not blame the Japanese for his exile. As Itagaki's and Malek's accounts show, it 
was Ibrahim's own decision to go to Jakarta to attend the Indonesian independence
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POSTSCRIPT
Ibrahim’s flight to Jakarta in August 1945 began what was to be a long exile. 
He did not step on Malaysian soil again until July 20, 1973. Any earlier return 
had been impossible because the authorities in peninsular West Malaysia (formerly 
Malaya)—both the colonial regime and its successor, the government of indepen­
dent Malaya under Tengku Abdul Rahman—had regarded him as a dangerous 
political activist. Soon after the British Army reoccupied Malaya in September 
1945, Ibrahim was put on the "wanted” list of its Field Security Service.
In November 1955—about two years before Malaya achieved independence— 
Ibrahim had an informal meeting in Jakarta with Tengku Abdul Rahman, who was 
then Chief Minister. The Tengku was on an official visit to Indonesia at President 
Sukarno's invitation. The meeting revealed their irreconcilable positions. The 
Tengku intended to achieve independence for Malaya as a sovereign state within 
the British Commonwealth, while Ibrahim wanted Malaya's independence through 
merger with Indonesia within Indonesia Raya. During his early years of exile in 
Jakarta, Ibrahim's political stance was much to the left. Later, under Sukarno's 
patronage, he was appointed a member of the Indonesian Parliament, where he was 
known as Iskander Kamel. When Sukarno fell from power after the Gestapu affair, 
Ibrahim gave up politics and started the Bank Pertiwi, of which he was president- 
director at the time of his death.
In 1973 Ibrahim applied for permission, and was allowed by the late Tun Abdul 
Razak, to return to Malaysia for a short visit. In December of that same year he 
returned to Malaysia again—it was to be his last trip.
Ibrahim Yaacob died in Jakarta on March 8, 1979. News of his death was re­
ceived in Kuala Lumpur by a relative, Datuk Hamzah bin Abu Samah, Malaysia's 
Attorney-General. There was no official reaction to the announcement, but the 
following day Malay newspapers carried obituaries. The Utusan Malaysia of March 
18, 1979, reported that Ibrahim was buried in the Heroes' Cemetery at Kalibata, 
indicating that Indonesia has honored him as a patriot.
ceremony. In Agastya, Sedjarah, p. 137, he reiterates that he left for Jakarta on 
just this mission, but adds that it was in fulfillment of "the Japanese program." 
Apparently, blaming the Japanese was a convenient ex post facto excuse for his 
exile.
